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I. Introduction 
A new tax break may drive as much as $100 billion in 
investments to impoverished neighborhoods over the next ten 
years.1 The tax break, which was buried within the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017,2 provides tax relief to individuals and businesses 
that make indirect investments in low-income communities 
designated as “Opportunity Zones.”3 Notwithstanding the 
undeniable enthusiasm among many investors and members of the 
development community,4 industry watchers and anti-poverty 
                                                                                                     
 1. Jon Banister, Investors Lining Up to Pour Billions into Opportunity 
Zones, BISNOW (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/economic-
development/investors-lining-up-to-pour-money-into-opportunity-zones-93572 
(explaining the national interest in the new Opportunity Zone investment areas) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); 
Richard Rubin, New ‘Opportunity Zone’ Tax-Break Rules Offer Flexibility to 
Developers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-
opportunity-zone-tax-break-rules-offer-flexibility-to-developers-1539948600 
(explaining the Trump Administration’s business-friendly clarification on 
Opportunity Zone rules and regulations) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 2. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (Dec. 22, 2017) (“An Act To provide 
for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the 
budget for fiscal year 2018.”).  
 3. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018) (defining a qualified opportunity zone). 
Under the new tax law, taxpayers who sell appreciated property can defer or, 
sometimes, exempt taxes they would otherwise owe on capital gains by 
reinvesting sale proceeds in so-called “Opportunity Funds.” See id. In turn, 
Opportunity Funds are required to make new equity investments in businesses 
located in designated Opportunity Zones. Id. 
 4. See Dane Stangler, Turning Opportunity Zones into Real Opportunities 
with Launch Pad, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2019, 12:36 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danestangler/2019/02/06/turning-opportunity-
zones-into-real-opportunities-with-launch-pad/#793d49b73bfe (emphasizing 
potential utilization of opportunity zones to develop place-based policy) (on file 
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advocates continue to debate whether Opportunity Zones hold 
promise as a solution to impoverished communities.5  
This debate is not new.6 Tax incentives used to drive 
investment to low-income areas, which this Article refers to as 
“place-based investment tax incentives,” have been controversial 
since they first appeared in 1980s.7 Yet, despite a considerable 
amount of empirical research,8 their impact on poor communities 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 5. See, e.g., Edmund Andrews, Will “Opportunity Zones” Lift Neighborhoods 
Out of Poverty, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/will-opportunity-zones-lift-neighborhoods-
out-poverty (analyzing how incentives may work and mapping the demographic 
and economic characteristics of tracts now being designated as Opportunity 
Zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 6. See Noah Buhayar, Will ‘Opportunity Zones’ Help the Rich, the Poor or 
Both?, WASH. POST: BLOOMBERG QUICK TAKE (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/will-opportunity-zoneshelp-the-rich-
the-poor-or-both/2019/01/04/2a1e153a-0fe1-11e9-8f0c-
6f878a26288a_story.html?utm_term=.1c41dcf6a93d (comparing Opportunity 
Zones with the previous Empowerment Zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 7. See, e.g., Noah Buhayar, For Goldman, a Tax Break Makes Helping Poor 
More Lucrative, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2018-08-29/goldman-sachs-leads-race-for-tax-break-helping-poor-
communities (“Opportunity funds are both innovative and controversial. They 
have to focus their investments in roughly 8,700 low-income communities selected 
by state governors and other officials. Zones range from gritty urban 
neighborhoods to shrinking Rust Belt towns.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 8. See, e.g., Deirdre Oakley & Hui-Shien Tsao, A New Way of Revitalizing 
Distressed Urban Communities? Assessing the Impact of the Federal 
Empowerment Zone Program, 28 J. URB. AFF. 443, 443–71 (2006); ROBERT 
RHERMANN, ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE ENTERPRISE ZONE TAX CREDIT (2014), 
http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/TaxFiscalPlan/WEB- Evaluation- of- t
he- Enterprise-Zone-Tax-Credit.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil  Rights& Social Justice); DAVID STOKES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENTERPRISE 
ZONES IN MISSOURI 20 (2013) https://showmeinstitute.org/sites/default/ 
files/14_EnterpriseZ ones_Singles_0.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business 
Incentives and Local Labor Markets, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311, 311–44 (2013); 
Devon Lynch & Jeffrey S. Zax, Incidence and Substitution in Enterprise Zone 
Programs: The Case of Colorado, 39 PUBLIC FINANCE REV. 226–55 (2011); Jed 
Kolko & David Neumark, Do Some Enterprise Zones Create Jobs?, 29 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS MGMT. 5–38 (2010); Joel A. Elvery, The Impact of Enterprise Zones on 
Resident Employment: An Evaluation of the Enterprise Zone Programs of 
California and Florida, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 44–59 (2009); Stephen Billings, Do 
Enterprise Zones Work?: An Analysis at the Borders, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 68, 68–93 
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remains unclear. This Article analyzes the current legal landscape 
of place-based investment tax incentives, and it develops a 
typology to aid tax researchers, poverty law researchers, social 
scientists, and policymakers as they work to understand the limits 
and potential of tax law as a tool to fight neighborhood poverty. 
Among the most pessimistic views of place-based investment 
tax incentives is that such laws are mere giveaways to businesses 
and their high-income shareholders.9 From this perspective, not 
only do such laws undermine progressivity in the tax system while 
utterly failing to benefit poor communities, but they also reinforce 
structural inequality in ways that actively harm the poor.10 Indeed, 
many studies cast doubt on whether place-based investment tax 
                                                                                                     
(2009); Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Do Local Tax Incentives Affect 
Economic Growth? What Mean Impacts Miss in The Analysis of Enterprise Zone 
Policies, 37 REG. SCI. URBAN ECON. 121, 121–36 (2007); Robert T. Greenbaum & 
John B. Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban Manufacturing 
Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 315, 315–39 (2004); JOEL A. 
ELVERY, THE IMPACT OF ENTERPRISE ZONES ON RESIDENT EMPLOYMENT: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS OF CALIFORNIA AND FLORIDA 
(2004), http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/1793 (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Karen Mossberger, State-Federal 
Diffusion and Policy Learning: From Enterprise Zones to Empowerment Zones, 29 
PUBLIUS: J. FED. 31, 31–50 (1999); Margaret G. Wilder & Barry M. Rubin, Rhetoric 
Versus Reality: A Review of Studies on State Enterprise Zone Programs, 62 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASSOC. 473, 473–91 (1996); Audrey G. McFarlane, Empowerment Zones: 
Urban Revitalization Through Collaborative Enterprise, 5 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 35–54 (1995); Dina Schlossberg, The 
Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities: New Cure for Distressed Urban 
Communities or the Same Old Band-Aid, 2 HYBRID 33, 33– 42 (1994); Elizabeth 
M. Gunn, The Growth of Enterprise Zones: A Policy Transformation, 21 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 432, 432–49 (1993); Wayne E. Ruhter, Enterprise Zones: Some Empirical 
Observations Symposium on the New Federalism and Urban Opportunities: 
Comment, 2 CATO J. 407, 407–10 (1982). 
 9. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Opportunity Zones May Create More 
Opportunities for Investors and Syndicators Than Distressed Communities Tax 
Policy Center, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.taxpolicy 
center.org/taxvox/opportunity-zones-may-create-more-opportunities-investors-
and-syndicators-distressed (raising the alarm on the lack of government oversight 
with Opportunity Zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice).  
 10. Id. 
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incentives help create jobs,11 reduce unemployment,12 or reduce 
poverty levels.13 Others provide strong evidence that a significant 
portion of tax-subsidy value is often captured by private market 
investors, syndicators, and developers rather than flowing into 
poor communities.14 Still others suggest that some place-based 
investment tax incentives contribute to gentrification and 
displacement.15 
                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Do Local Tax 
Incentives Affect Economic Growth? What Mean Impacts Miss in the Analysis of 
Enterprise Zone Policies, 37 REG. SCI. & URB. ECON. 121, 133 (2007) (“The results 
indicate that positive zone-induced increases in employment, sales, and capital 
expenditures in new and existing establishments are offset by zone-induced losses 
among firms that close or leave the zone area.”); Jed Kolko & David Neumark, Do 
Some Enterprise Zones Create Jobs?, 29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 20 (2010) 
(“In light of the fact that the average effect of enterprise zones is near zero, 
evidence of variation in the effects of enterprise zones could suggest that some 
enterprise zones increase employment, while others decrease it.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Andrew Hanson, Local Employment, Poverty, and Property 
Value Effects of Geographically-Targeted Tax Incentives: An Instrumental 
Variables Approach, 39 REG. SCI. URB. ECON. 721, 730 (2009) (showing that 
property values may be impacted more than unemployment); Joel A. Elvery, The 
Impact of Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment: An Evaluation of the 
Enterprise Zone Programs of California and Florida, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 44, 57 
(2009) (detailing the problems with estimating the impact of enterprise zone 
programs). 
 13. See Douglas J. Krupka & Douglas S. Noonan, Empowerment Zones, 
Neighborhood Change and Owner-Occupied Housing, 39 REG. SCI. URB. ECON. 
386, 394 (2009) (examining the direct price effects on neighborhood price levels, 
including housing stock). 
 14. See Gregory S. Burge, Do Tenants Capture the Benefits from the 
Low- Income Housing Tax Credit Program?, 39 REAL EST. ECON. 71, 72 (2011) 
(finding that tenants capture less than half of the credit benefits in the form of 
rental savings and that such savings are highest in the early years of a projects' 
occupancy); Michael Eickhoff & Steve Carter, Accessing Capital Through the New 
Markets Tax Credit Program, 29 J. ST. TAX. RIVERWOODS 17 (2011) (explaining 
that the NMTC is typically transferred to a third-party investor at a discount 
ranging between $0.68 and $0.74 per dollar of credit in exchange for capital 
infusion into the project); Mihir A. Desai, Dhammika Dharmapala & Monica 
Singhal, Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing: The Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit, 24 TAX POL’Y ECON. 181, 185 (2010) (explaining that LIHTC investors 
"purchase" credits a discount and that syndication costs may consume 10–27% of 
equity invested in LIHTC projects). 
 15. See, e.g., Matthew Freedman, Teaching New Markets Old Tricks: The 
Effects of Subsidized Investment on Low-Income Neighborhoods, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 
1000, 1013 (2012) (finding that the NMTC has some positive effects on 
neighborhood conditions in low-income communities but observing that the 
observed impacts are attributable to changes in the composition of residents as 
408 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 403 (2019) 
But not all of the empirical studies have such dire conclusions. 
Some have found positive impacts on communities, including lower 
poverty rates,16 increased employment17 and higher home values.18 
Though such studies are in the minority and tend to focus on 
economic indicators (as opposed to factors like health, crime, or 
education that also impact communities),19 they nevertheless 
provide some hope that place-based investment tax incentives 
could lead to positive outcomes for poor communities if 
appropriately designed. Meanwhile, policymakers have long 
presented place-based investment tax incentives to the public as 
anti-poverty programs,20 and some recent legal scholarship has 
categorized place-based investment tax incentives as a subset of 
anti-poverty tax laws.21  
Setting aside the question of whether current place-based 
investment tax incentives are intended as or designed to be 
anti-poverty laws,22 it is essential to understand their impact on 
poor communities. To do so, we must move beyond mere debates 
                                                                                                     
opposed to improvements in the welfare of existing residents). 
 16. See Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (“[I]t may be more likely that 
geographically-targeted tax incentives and grants benefit land owners, therefore 
caution should be used when crafting policy that is tied to location if the intended 
effect is to improve labor market outcomes for residents.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 15, at 1000 (“Poverty and unemployment 
rates fall by statistically significant amounts in tracts that receive 
NMTC- subsidized investment relative to similar tracts that do not.”). 
 18. See Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394. (“We find these results 
striking in light of the goals and rationale of the policy. Empowerment Zones were 
not billed as property value enhancement programs.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 15, at 1002–03 (utilizing an 
“econometric” approach to analyze the effect of tax-based incentives). 
 20. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones Los Angeles, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1341, 1341–42 (1992) (describing President Bush’s effort to use enterprise 
zones to reduce poverty). 
 21. See Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 
810–15 (2014) (categorizing place-based investment incentives in exactly that 
way). 
 22. In a companion article, I have argued that most place-based investment 
tax incentives have their origins in pro-gentrification policies and are designed to 
subsidize businesses, but that the strongest justifications for such laws rest on 
pro-social grounds. As such, place-based investment tax incentives should be 
redesigned to better advance anti-poverty goals. This can be accomplished by 
prioritizing poor communities over other beneficiaries of the tax laws. See 
Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax 
Incentives, WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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over the merits of place-based investment tax incentives and find 
a way to navigate the morass of contradictory empirical findings 
about these tax laws. To help fill this need, this Article develops a 
typology of place-based investment tax incentives that can be used 
to evaluate the relevance of empirical findings, identify new areas 
of research, and predict the impact of specific tax incentive designs. 
This Article makes several contributions to tax, poverty, and 
empirical legal literature. First, it defines the category of 
place-based investment tax incentives and identifies key elements 
of variation across the category. Despite their prevalence at all 
levels of government, place-based investment tax incentives 
remain undertheorized and largely undefined in the literature. 
The typology presented here reflects an analysis of three federal 
tax incentives (the New Markets Tax Credit,23 the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit,24 and the new Opportunity Zones law25) and 
a detailed survey of tax incentives included in state enterprise zone 
laws.26 By defining this category of tax laws and identifying the 
basic types of place-based investment tax incentives that exist—or 
may not yet exist—under current law, this Article helps situate the 
conversation about these tax laws within broader tax policy 
debates. 
Second, the typology presented here can be used by both tax 
and poverty law researchers to help assess the applicability of 
                                                                                                     
 23. I.R.C. § 45D (2018); see New Markets Tax Credit Program, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/new-markets-
tax-credit/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (explaining the incentives 
of using the NMTC program to attract private investment to distressed 
communities) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 24. I.R.C. § 42 (2018); see Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, OFF. OF HOUSING 
& URB. DEV., OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/ 
lihtc.html. (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (identifying the most important resource for 
creating affordable housing in the United States) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 25. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018); see Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked 
Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions. 
(providing a list of common questions about Opportunity Zones) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 26. Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise Zone Tax 
Incentives, Working Paper (May 1, 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3381243. 
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existing empirical studies to specific types of place-based 
investment tax incentives. Social scientists have published dozens 
of impact studies focusing on a wide variety of place-based 
investment tax incentives.27 Those studies, which have focused on 
both state and federal tax laws and their impact throughout the 
country, have sometimes reached contradictory conclusions.28 The 
ability of legal researchers to advance the debate over place-based 
investment tax incentives—and to predict the impact of new laws 
like Opportunity Zones—depends upon making sense of these 
studies. 
Third, this Article identifies areas for further legal and 
empirical research. As will be explained, community-oriented 
types of place-based investment tax incentives, which contain 
features specifically designed to benefit residents of poor 
communities, are uncommon under existing law. These rare types 
of tax incentives are theoretically promising and enjoy some 
empirical support;29 nevertheless, due in part to their rarity, they 
have been largely understudied. The most complete understanding 
of place-based investment tax incentives, therefore, will require 
additional research about the ideal design and impact of 
community-oriented investment tax incentives.  
Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II 
introduces a two-dimensional typology to describe the category of 
place-based investment tax incentives. Part II.A. presents the first 
dimension, which asks whether the tax laws subsidize businesses 
directly or indirectly through subsidized financing. Part II.B. 
presents the second dimension, which asks whether the tax law 
prioritizes improved profitability within a space, or whether it 
prioritizes improved neighborhood conditions for the benefit of the 
community that lives in that space. Part III applies the typology to 
identify four distinct types of place-based investment tax 
incentives and revisits existing empirical literature with respect to 
each type in order to identify gaps in the literature and areas for 
future research. Part IV concludes with final observations about 
                                                                                                     
 27. See supra note 8. 
 28. See infra Part III (identifying four distinct types of place-based 
investment tax incentives as well as revisiting existing empirical literature with 
respect to each type in order to identify gaps in the literature and areas for future 
research). 
 29. See Layser, supra note 22, at 61–64; see also infra Part III. 
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how this typology can be applied and used by future researchers 
and policymakers. 
II. The Typology 
This Part presents a two-dimensional typology to describe 
place-based investment tax incentives.30 The goal of the typology 
is twofold. First, it aims to disaggregate key elements of variation 
in the concept of place-based investment tax incentives so that the 
design choices—and the limitations associated with those 
choices—will be more salient to legal researchers and lawmakers. 
Second, it seeks to provide a conceptual framework to help assess 
the relevance of empirical studies to different types of tax 
incentives. Identifying what we know, and what we do not know, 
about place-based investment tax incentives is the first step 
toward understanding their potential as anti-poverty tools. 
Place-based investment tax incentives are distinguishable by 
characteristics along two dimensions. As explained below, the first 
dimension draws from tax expenditure theory to consider the 
mechanism by which the tax incentives subsidize investments.31 It 
asks whether the tax incentives deliver tax subsidies directly to 
businesses that invest in low-income communities, or whether they 
deliver tax subsidies to those businesses indirectly via tax benefits 
claimed by third-party investors.32 Accordingly, the first dimension 
                                                                                                     
 30. Significantly, the typology presented here is “based on the notion of an 
ideal type, a mental construct that deliberately accentuates certain 
characteristics and not necessarily something that is found in empirical reality.” 
See Kevin B. Smith, Typologies, Taxonomies, and the Benefits of Policy 
Classification, 30 POL’Y STUD. J. 379, 380–81 (2002) (clarifying the advantages 
that a taxonomic approach to policy classification may above and beyond 
traditional typologies). Throughout the analysis, this Article will refer to current 
tax law as illustrative examples; nevertheless, this typology seeks to reach beyond 
existing law in order to help imagine alternative types of incentives that are rare 
or absent within existing federal and state tax systems. 
 31. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Tahk, supra note 21, at 810–15 (offering commentary on the efficacy 
on poverty of various forms of tax credits). Note that to the extent that they 
ultimately confer benefit to poor communities, any place-based investment tax 
incentives (direct or indirect) can be understood as indirect subsidies to the poor. 
Id. 
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divides place-based investment tax incentives into direct tax 
subsidies and indirect tax subsidies.  
The second dimension draws from geographic theories about 
space and place to consider the mechanism by which the tax 
incentives target investments to low-income areas. It asks whether 
tax incentives target low-income areas by emphasizing economic 
and physical conditions within spatial boundaries, or by 
emphasizing how community members experience those 
conditions.33 In this way, the second-dimension divides place-based 
investment tax incentives into spatially-oriented investment tax 
incentives and community oriented investment tax incentives. 
Together, this two-by-two typology yields four possible 
combinations of place-based investment tax incentives: Both direct 
and indirect forms of spatially-oriented investment tax incentives, 
and both direct and indirect forms of community-oriented 
investment tax incentives. The remainder of this Part will 
elaborate upon the two dimensions of the typology and will identify 
issues presented by each dimension that may have bearing on their 
capacity for use as anti-poverty tools.  
A. The First Dimension: Direct vs. Indirect Tax Subsidies 
Tax expenditure theory emphasizes the economic equivalence 
of tax preferences and direct expenditures.34 Under the theory, all 
investment tax incentives can be understood as “tax subsidies” 
used to promote investment.35 Accordingly, the first dimension of 
the typology focuses on the way that the tax incentives subsidize 
investment. To understand the distinction between direct and 
indirect tax subsidies, however, it is helpful to understand the 
concept of tax incidence.  
                                                                                                     
 33. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (examining the history of 
federal investment in urban neighborhoods that leaves unresolved the benefits 
for people of color). 
 34. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705, 706, 711 (1970) (arguing that tax incentives are generally 
inferior to direct subsidies as a means of achieving social goals). 
 35. Id. 
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Tax incidence describes the person or persons who bear the 
burden of a tax or enjoy the benefit of a tax preference.36 The 
actual, economic incidence of a tax law may be distinct from its 
technical incidence.37 In other words, the taxpayer who claims a 
tax preference on a tax return may not be the sole beneficiary of 
its value.38 For example, a subsidy theory is used to explain the 
function of charitable donations deductions.39 That theory assumes 
that the deduction subsidizes charities, not the taxpayers who 
claim the deduction.40 In other words, charities receive an indirect 
tax subsidy when donors increase the size of their charitable 
contributions in response to the deduction. 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that the elimination of tax expenditures is 
a flawed approach to tax reform). 
 37. Technical incidence refers to the taxpayer who claims the tax preference, 
and the specific activity that gives rise to the tax preference. For example, as 
explained below, a taxpayer may claim a tax credit for investing in a Community 
Development Entity. The technical incidence falls on that taxpayer claimant on 
the CDE investment. Nevertheless, if the tax preference ultimately helps increase 
the amount of money that the CDE invests in low-income businesses, then the 
economic incidence may inure to the low-income business. 
 38. See Sugin, supra note 36 (arguing that the elimination of tax 
expenditures is a flawed approach to tax reform). 
 39. See generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax 
Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 505 (2010) 
(arguing the need to explicitly address distributive justice to enhance 
understanding of tax subsidies). 
 40. See Sugin, supra note 36 (arguing that the elimination of tax 
expenditures is a flawed approach to tax reform). 
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Here, a justification for place-based investment tax incentives 
is to subsidize businesses that invest in low-income communities.41 
This tax subsidy may be delivered directly to such businesses in 
the form of tax credits or deductions.42 Nevertheless, as this 
Section will explain, the tax subsidy may also be delivered to those 
businesses indirectly by providing tax credits or deductions to 
investors who increase the amount that they invest in such 
businesses. The figure below displays the distinction between 
direct and indirect tax subsidies. 
Stated somewhat differently, the goal of any investment tax 
incentive is to motivate taxpayers to make a financial or business 
investment.43 But a choice must be made as to whether to use tax 
incentives to subsidize financing, or to use tax incentives to 
influence businesses’ decisions about how to put their capital to 
work through labor or capital investment. Depending on how this 
choice is resolved, the tax incentives may target radically different 
types of claimants, give rise to different types of tax-motivated 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Fleischer, supra note 39, at 517–18 (arguing the need to explicitly 
address distributive justice to enhance understanding of tax subsidies). 
 42. Surrey, supra note 34, at 711 (arguing that tax incentives are generally 
inferior to direct subsidies as a means of achieving social goals despite economic 
equivalence). 
 43. See id. (noting the goals of investment taxes). 
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transactions, and present a range of unique but predictable 
challenges. 
As a result, the choice between direct and indirect tax 
subsidies can have important implications for the effectiveness of 
the tax incentives as anti-poverty tools. This Section will elaborate 
on this division of place-based investment tax incentives—those 
targeting businesses and those targeting third-party investors. In 
addition, it will explain how the choice between direct and indirect 
tax subsidies affects the types of claimants and transactions 
motivated by the tax incentives. 
1. Direct Tax Subsidies 
Direct tax subsidies provide tax breaks directly to businesses 
that invest in low-income communities.44 A defining feature of tax 
incentives within this dimension is that they are claimed directly 
by eligible businesses to subsidize costs associated with starting, 
expanding, or operating a business.45 Stated simply, direct tax 
subsidies make it cheaper for eligible taxpayers to do business.46 
With this basic definition in mind, this Section identifies two 
characteristics of direct tax incentives that have bearing on their 
impact. 
First, the direct form confers a significant amount of power to 
lawmakers to determine which businesses should be eligible for 
the tax preferences.47 This is because direct tax incentives are 
available to any business defined by lawmakers as eligible.48 These 
businesses often do not compete with other businesses for the tax 
subsidies; as long as they satisfy the statutory criteria, they can 
                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2016) (providing an example of 
direct tax subsidies). 
 45. See id. (providing tax breaks for starting, expanding, or operating a 
business). 
 46. This goal is distinct from the other major category of place-based 
investment tax incentives, which are designed to increase the amount of low-cost 
financing available to these businesses. 
 47. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1397C (2018) (defining “qualified business entities” for 
the purposes of this section). 
 48. See id. (providing a tax break for business that meet the statutory 
requirements of a “qualified business entity”). 
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claim the tax benefits.49 For example, many state enterprise zone 
programs provide direct tax subsidies that are more valuable to 
capital-heavy businesses like manufacturers and producers than 
labor-heavy businesses like retail.50 In fact, some states 
specifically exclude common labor-heavy businesses from 
eligibility.51 Because capital-intensive businesses may create fewer 
jobs than labor-intensive businesses,52 the type of businesses that 
respond to the tax incentives can profoundly affect their impact. If 
job creation is an important objective of the tax law, then a direct 
tax incentive that broadly targets capital-intensive businesses is 
likely to fail. 
Second, direct tax subsidies are heavily reliant on businesses’ 
actual, current tax exposure. Direct tax subsidies may take the 
form of tax credits or tax deductions,53 but in either instance, their 
                                                                                                     
 49. See id. (allowing any qualified business entity to gain tax benefits). 
 50. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-30-105.1(6)(b), (f) (noting that 
eligible taxpayers include manufacturers, producers, storage facilities, certain 
agricultural businesses). The federal Empowerment Zones laws and most state 
enterprise zone laws described above follow this model: Eligibility for the tax 
incentives usually requires the taxpayer to be located in the zone. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 1397C (2018); ALA. CODE § 41-23-24 (2019) (dictating the process of selecting 
enterprise zones in Alabama); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.73(b)(11)(A) (West 
2019) (defining “qualified taxpayer” for purposes of the credit as an entity that is 
engaged in a trade or business within a designated census tract or economic 
development area); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-30-105.1(1)(a)(I) (West 2019) 
(allowing a tax credit for any taxpayer who establishes a new business facility in 
an enterprise zone); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217(e) (West 2019) (allowing a 
tax credit for any manufacturing facility located in an enterprise zone); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 42-64.3-7 (West 2019) (defining corporation for purposes of the section); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-28-203(4) (West 2019) (defining qualified businesses for 
purposes of the tax benefit); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 63N-2-212 (West 2019) 
(defining business entities that qualify for the tax incentive); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
238.399(5)(a-c) (West 2019) (defining airport development zones that can qualify 
for tax credits). Tying taxpayer eligibility to a specific location creates an 
incentive for some existing businesses to relocate to that area. See April, supra 
note 20, at 1348; see also infra Appendix A (showing that 11/33 state enterprise 
zone laws include tax incentives that promote investment in manufacturing or 
production activities).  
 51. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.73(b)(11)(C) (2019) (excluding 
retail trade businesses and food services businesses, among others). 
 52. AMANDA ROSS & KAITLYN WOLF, DO MARKET-BASED TAX INCENTIVES 
ATTRACT NEW BUSINESSES? EVIDENCE FROM THE NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 18 
(June 25, 2014), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/124360/1/ERSA 
2014_00653.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 53. See Policy Basics: Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits, CTR. ON 
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value derives from decreasing a business’s tax liability.54 For 
example, tax credits may be available to businesses that expand in 
a particular area.55 Tax credits enable a taxpayer to offset the 
amount of tax it would otherwise owe on a dollar-for-dollar basis.56 
Nevertheless, unless the tax credit is refundable, the taxpayer 
cannot use the tax credit unless it has actual tax liability to offset.57 
Because many new businesses have little current tax liability, they 
would be unable to use the tax credits.58  
Even if a business does have current tax liability, the value 
received from tax savings would not necessarily enable it to make 
capital-intensive investments, such as large projects or new 
construction.59 This is because the tax subsidy represents only a 
percentage of the business’s actual investment (e.g., a refund of 
50% of dollars spent on an employee’s salary or a capital 
investment), and it does not provide the subsidized capital needed 
to finance those investments.60 If a business needs capital for its 
project, then the project may remain unfunded, and the eligible 
investment may not be made. As a result, the direct form may not 
be appropriate if the goal is to encourage new business startups or 
other capital-intensive projects.  
2. Indirect Tax Subsidies 
In contrast, indirect tax subsidies target third-party investors 
as claimants, with the ultimate goal of subsidizing businesses that 
                                                                                                     
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-tax-exemptions-
deductions-and-credits (explaining tax credits and deductions) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 54. See id. (describing the value of direct tax subsidies). 
 55. See id. (noting that some credits incentives business to expand). 
 56. See id. (explaining the mechanics of a tax credit). 
 57. See Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy 
Production: The Case for a Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 MO. L. REV. 453, 
453 (2016) (arguing that the production tax credit should be a refundable credit). 
 58. See id. (explaining that many tax credits can be carried forward for use 
in later years when the taxpayer has tax liability; nevertheless, the value of the 
tax credit erodes with time, and the uncertainty of future income may make the 
incentives less powerful). 
 59. See Layser, supra note 22. 
 60. See id. 
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engage with low-income communities. Unlike direct tax subsidies, 
which create incentives for businesses to perform certain activities 
in low-income areas (e.g., starting or expanding a business, or 
hiring certain employees),61 indirect tax subsidies create incentives 
for investors to make capital contributions (debt or equity) in those 
businesses.62 By subsidizing the investments, these tax laws 
decrease the cost of capital for businesses that engage with low-
income communities, and generally increase the availability of 
financing.63 In this way, the tax laws deliver indirect tax subsidies 
to these businesses in the form of subsidized capital. 
Indirect tax subsidies are distinct from their direct 
counterparts in at least two ways that can affect their impact. 
First, unlike direct tax incentives that give lawmakers the sole 
power to determine what kinds of businesses will be subsidized, 
indirect tax incentives transfer some of that power to the private 
market.64 At a minimum, investors are free to choose among the 
field of eligible projects in order to decide which projects to fund.65 
This allows investors to contribute to the selection process, and it 
allows the private market to help identify high-value projects. 
Lawmakers could narrowly define the category of underlying 
businesses that are eligible to receive the tax subsidized capital, 
thereby constraining investors’ choices.66 But as a practical matter, 
such laws are often written broadly to ensure a large field of 
eligible businesses, thereby ensuring that the private market has 
significant discretion to choose which projects to finance.67 
Nevertheless, investors’ preferences may not always match the 
objectives of lawmakers. To the extent that a particular type of 
                                                                                                     
 61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2019) (providing an example of 
direct tax subsidies). 
 62. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (providing the new markets tax credit to 
applicable taxpayers). 
 63. See, e.g., id. (providing the new markets tax credit to applicable 
taxpayers). 
 64. See, e.g., id. (allowing the credit for qualified equity investments and 
investment in qualified community investment entities). 
 65. See, e.g., id. (same). 
 66. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing indirect community-oriented 
investment tax incentives). 
 67. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (allowing the new markets tax credit for 
eligible taxpayers). 
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investment is desired, it would make sense for lawmakers to draft 
narrow definitions of eligible projects. 
Second, unlike direct tax subsidies, which do not subsidize 
capital and are generally unable to support projects with 
significant financing needs,68 indirect tax subsidies do have this 
capacity. In fact, indirect tax subsidies help address a significant 
challenge faced by affordable housing and community 
development: The inability of developers to attract sufficient 
equity financing to satisfy creditors’ required debt-equity ratios.69 
CDEs and affordable housing developers rely on tax credit 
monetization transactions to convert tax credit value into 
financing,70 enabling them to finance their projects (or invest in 
low-income communities) with public money. 
While some state tax laws provide tax credits to investors that 
contribute directly to eligible entities in tax favored zones,71 
current law also contains two significant variations of indirect tax 
subsidies. Both of these variations are capable of financing large, 
                                                                                                     
 68. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2019). 
 69. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2 (May 11, 2017) 
(on file with the author); see also COHN REZNICK LLP, THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM AT YEAR 25: AN EXPANDED LOOK AT ITS PERFORMANCE (2012), 
https://www.cohnreznick.com/sites/default/files/2012lihtc/cohnreznick-lihtc-
2012-fullreport.pdf (describing net tax credit equity) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Without subsidies, investors are 
unwilling to make equity investments in affordable housing or community 
development projects because the expected rate of return is too low—and creditors 
are unwilling to lend to projects without sufficient equity. Id. The LIHTC and 
NMTC exist to provide this subsidy and to encourage and enable equity 
investments in projects that serve low-income communities. 
 70. In monetization transactions, investors make equity contributions in 
exchange for the ability to claim the tax credits as they are earned in future years. 
See generally Thomas W. Giegerich, Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA. 
TAX REV. 709 (2012) (describing tax credit monetization). The tax credits are 
earned over a period of ten years (in the case of the LIHTC) and seven years (in 
the case of the NMTC). See I.R.C. §§ 42, 45D (2018). 
 71. See, e.g., 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8904-A(a) (West 2019) (allowing a tax credit 
for business that engages in a range of statutorily defined activities in 
impoverished areas); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2004 (West 2019) (allowing a tax 
credit for Delaware businesses that contribute to “a neighborhood organization” 
or that provide “neighborhood assistance in an impoverished area”); see also Rick 
Cohen, Nonprofits and State Tax Systems: The Big Picture, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 
18, 2013), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/04/18/nonprofits-and-state-tax-
systems-the-big-picture/./ (providing an overview of the tax diversity from state 
to state) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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capital intensive projects. The first are tax credits that are 
monetized through transactions with third-party investors in 
low- income communities.72 This Article refers to this model as the 
“tax equity model.” The second variation are tax laws that provide 
temporary or permanent tax exemptions with respect to money or 
property used to help finance businesses that invest in low-income 
areas.73 This Article will refer to this model as the “fund model.” 
Both models are explained in detail below, and their advantages 
and disadvantages are discussed. 
a. Tax Equity Model 
Indirect tax subsidies adopting the tax equity model facilitate 
project financing through a combination of public and private 
investment. A key characteristic of the tax equity model is that the 
size of the tax subsidy is often large enough to cover a substantial 
portion of project costs, but access to the subsidy typically depends 
on a process called tax credit monetization.74 As a practical matter, 
monetization refers to “purchases” of tax credits by the third-party 
investors, who size their investments based on the amount of tax 
credits allocated.75 In other words, monetization transactions can 
be understood as investments in tax credits. In addition to 
explaining how the tax equity model works, this section will 
explain how the identity of investors—and their motivation—may 
affect the impact of these tax incentives.  
Tax credit monetization is best explained through an 
illustration, whereby a prototypical example is the approach taken 
by the federal New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC).76 In the most 
basic sense, the NMTC allows a tax credit to taxpayers who invest 
in entities that, in turn, invest in businesses that engage with 
                                                                                                     
 72. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 73. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 74. See generally Giegerich, supra note 70 (describing tax credit 
monetization).  
 75. See id. (characterizing tax credit monetization). 
 76. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (providing the new markets tax credit to 
applicable taxpayers). The NMTC was introduced under the Clinton 
Administration about seven years after the federal Empowerment Zone laws went 
into effect. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
§ 1(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763. 
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low- income communities.77 In practice, however, the value of the 
NMTC is realized through sophisticated tax credit monetization 
transactions. In the typical transaction, an investment group 
certified as a “community development entity” (CDE)78 will apply 
to the federal Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFI) Fund for tax credit allocations.79 Nevertheless, despite the 
allocation process, CDEs neither earn, nor claim, the tax credits.80 
                                                                                                     
 77. See I.R.C. § 45D(a) (2018) (providing a tax credit to taxpayers who make 
“qualified equity investments,” which mean investments in a “qualified 
community development entity”); I.R.C. §§ 45D(a), (b) (2018) (defining eligible 
taxpayers); see also I.R.C. § 45D(c) (2018) (defining qualified community 
development entity for purposes of 45D); I.R.C. § 45D(b)(3) (2018) (providing a 
safe harbor); I.R.C. § 45D(d) (2018) (defining qualified low-income community 
investments by). As such, the definition of “low-income community” dominates 
the statutory scheme. See I.R.C. § 45D(e) (2018) (defining low-income 
community). 
 78. To obtain certification as a CDE, the investment group must have a 
primary mission of “serving, or providing investment capital for, low-income 
communities or low-income persons.” See I.R.C. § 45D(c) (2018) (defining qualified 
community development entity). As a practical matter, most CDE investments 
are directed to statutorily defined “low-income communities.” Under the statute, 
low-income communities refer to census tracts with a poverty rate of at least 20 
percent, or which meet certain median family income thresholds. I.R.C. § 45D(e) 
(2018): 
The term “low-income community” means any population census tract if—the 
poverty rate for such tract is at least 20 percent, or –in the case of a tract not 
located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract does 
not exceed 80 percent of statewide median family income, or –in the case of a 
tract located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract 
does not exceed 80 percent of the greater of statewide median family income or 
the metropolitan area median family income. Id. 
 79. See DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LORY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34402, 
NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2016) (describing the criteria an 
organization must meet to become certified as a CDE); see also New Markets Tax 
Credit Program, CDFI FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs- training/ 
Programs/new-markets-tax-credit/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2019) 
(explaining the NMTC application process) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); CDE Certification, CDFI FUND, 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/certification/cde/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining the CDE certification process) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). In 2018, the CDFI 
Fund was authorized to allocate $3.5 billion of NMTCs to CDEs. See I.R.C. 
§ 45D(f)(1)(G) (2018). 
 80. See MARPLES & LORY, supra note 79, at 2 (describing CDEs as 
intermediaries able to attract investors using the credits). Most CDEs are taxed 
as partnerships under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code. Partnership 
income, loss, and other tax items are not subject to entity level taxation but are 
instead taxable to the partners on their personal tax returns. See I.R.C. § 702 
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Instead, they offer the tax credits to private equity investors who 
make equity investments in for-profit CDEs.81 The amount of an 
investor’s equity investment is sized based on the anticipated 
future value of the tax credits, which they will earn over a 
seven-year period.82  
Another example of an indirect tax incentive that uses the tax 
equity model is the low-income housing tax credit.83 Monetization 
                                                                                                     
(2018) (providing a rule for tax credits for partnerships). Importantly, however, 
the New Markets Tax Credit is not earned at the partnership level. Instead, it is 
earned at the partner level. As explained later in this section, this distinction is 
material to determining whether the investments may be subject to passive 
activity loss limitations. 
 81. See MARPLES & LORY, supra note 79, at 1 (“After the CDE is awarded a 
tax credit allocation, the CDE is authorized to offer the tax credits to private 
equity investors in the CDE.”). Note that nonprofit CDEs can also apply for and 
receive NMTC allocations, but only for-profit CDEs can pass the tax credits along 
to its shareholders. Id. 
 82. See Eickhoff & Carter, supra note 14, at 77 (“If implemented successfully 
the purchaser’s [sic] of the NMTC credits will be able to claim the 39 percent 
NMTC over the subsequent 7 years.”). 
 83. See I.R.C. § 42 (2018) (stating the low-income housing credit statute). 
The LIHTC provides a tax credit to taxpayers who invest in affordable housing 
projects. The statute does not restrict the location of affordable housing projects, 
and in that sense, it does not target low-income areas as closely as the NMTC. 
Nevertheless, the statute does provide for larger tax credits when projects are 
located in certain high-poverty areas. I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B) (2018) (providing for a 
30% increase in tax credits for projects located in a “qualified census tract or a 
difficult development area”). A qualified census tract is any census tract in which 
“50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60 
percent of the area median gross income” or which “has a poverty rate of at least 
25 percent.” I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(ii) (2018). A difficult development area is any area 
designated by HUD as “an area which has high construction, land, and utility 
costs relative to area median gross income.” I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(iii) (2018). This 
creates an incentive to produce affordable housing in those targeted locations. See 
Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation, 93 IND. 
L.J. 915, 949 (2018) (describing how projects located in economically and racially 
segregated areas may be more likely to receive LIHTC allocations). In addition to 
the NMTC, several other federal and state investment tax incentives adopt the 
tax equity model. See generally Giegerich, supra note 70. Energy tax credits, like 
the wind energy production tax credit and the solar tax credit, also adopt this 
model, as do several investment tax credits. See I.R.C. § 48 (2018) (stating the 
energy tax credit). The federal Rehabilitation Tax Credit also follows the tax 
equity model in order to target place, but the targeted areas are not necessarily 
low-income areas. See I.R.C. § 47 (2018) (stating the rehabilitation tax credit). 
Rather, the Rehabilitation Tax Credit provides a tax incentive to rehabilitate 
structures in “registered historic districts.” See I.R.C. § 42(c) (2018) (defining 
qualified basis and qualified low-income buildings for purposes of LIHTC). 
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of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) follows a similar, 
but distinct, pattern as the NMTC.84 Affordable housing developers 
typically engage tax equity investors in monetization transactions 
rather than using the tax credits directly.85 Investors contribute 
capital to partnerships that own affordable housing projects.86 In 
exchange for their contributions, the investors receive the right to 
claim the tax credits as they are earned at the partnership level.87  
These transactions provide a creative solution to a problem 
that would otherwise render these indirect tax subsidies 
ineffective. Namely, the greatest capital needs of projects are in 
the early years, whereas the tax credits themselves are 
delivered over a span of seven years (in the case of the NMTC) 
or ten years (in the case of the LIHTC).88 An important purpose 
of tax monetization transactions is to address this timing 
mismatch.89 Tax equity investors size their investments 
according to the expected value of tax credits to be earned in 
the future, thereby enabling developers to use the entire credit 
value presently even though much of the value will be 
unavailable until future dates.90  
On the other hand, the impact of indirect tax incentives 
following the tax equity model is likely to be influenced by two 
factors. First, the identity of investors and their motivation 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Giegerich, supra note 70, at 749–52 (describing the LIHTC as a 
mechanism for delivering a federal subsidy to clearly defensible intended 
beneficiaries).  
 85. See id. at 744–52 (describing the LIHTC as a carve-out from pre-tax 
profit requirements and as a credit monetization technique). For a project to be 
eligible for tax credits, the developer must first apply to state and local housing 
authorities for tax credit allocations. As project owners, the developers of 
approved tax credit projects would be eligible to claim the tax credits. But, in most 
cases, the developers choose to monetize the tax credits. 
 86. See Desai et al., supra note 14, at 184–86 (describing the mechanics of 
LIHTC allocation). 
 87. See id. at 186 (explaining that the deal is often structured as a limited 
partnership between investors and developers). 
 88. See I.R.C. §§ 42, 45D (2018) (stating the applicable credit period for 
LIHTC and NMTC respectively). 
 89. See Giegerich, supra note 70, at 748 (explaining that the “investor ‘fronts’ 
a rent subsidy on behalf of the federal government . . . and is ‘reimbursed’ by the 
Treasury via the LIHTC”). 
 90. See Desai et al., supra note 14, at 189–90 (stating that the difference 
between the current purchase price of credits and the value of credits represents 
the investors’ return on investment). 
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may affect the types of projects that are funded.91 CDEs and 
developers are dependent on the participation of a specific pool 
of investors who are willing and able to participate in tax credit 
monetization.92 Nearly all tax equity investors are large  
                                                                                                     
 91. See JOINT CTR. HOUSE STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE DISRUPTION OF 
THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
RESPONSES, AND PROPOSED CORRECTIVES 3–4 (2009), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/disruption_of_the_lihtc_program_
2009_0.pdf (describing how the migration of the investor base to financial 
institutions concentrated investments on a limited number of large metropolitan 
areas) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 92. See COHN REZNICK, infra note 98, at 3 (explaining that in 2012, 83% of 
LIHTC investors were financial institutions); MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., NEW 
MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) PROGRAM EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT ix–x (2016), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24211/412958-new-
markets-tax-credit-nmtc-program-evaluation.pdf (noting that although the types 
of investors varied, the highest proportion of investors “constituted large 
international banks”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). Not only is the investor pool limited to those with sufficient cash 
and tax liability to make the tax-motivated investments possible and worthwhile, 
but it is further limited by features of the tax system designed to prevent abusive 
tax shelters. For example, the so-called passive activity loss rules limit the ability 
to prevent natural persons from claiming tax credits earned from passive 
activities to the extent that they exceed the taxpayers’ income from passive 
activities. See I.R.C. § 469(d)(2) (2018) (defining passive activity tax credit). 
Passive activities include those involving the conduct of a trade or business in 
which the taxpayer does not materially participate. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.4694 (2016) 
(defining “Trade or business activities”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5 (2016) (defining 
“material participation”). Many monetization transactions are subject to this rule. 
LIHTC investments are generally subject to passive activity loss rules. The 
typical tax credit claimant is a passive, limited partner of a project partnership. 
As such, the passive activity loss rules thus restrict the ability of natural persons 
to claim full tax benefits. See I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(C) (2018) (stating an exception for 
low-income housing credit); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
BANKS 36 (Mar. 2014) (“The number of taxpayers who can benefit from LIHTCs 
is limited by passive activity and alternative minimum tax rules.”). The practical 
effect is to limit the capacity of the LIHTC to motivate natural persons to invest 
in affordable housing projects. As a result, nearly all LIHTC investors are 
corporations. See Forrest David Milder & Ronald S. Borod, Rehabilitation Tax 
Credit and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, BNA PORTFOLIO 584-1st, § 3:III 
Passive Activity Limitations. In the context of the NMTC, on the other hand, the 
IRS has stated that the passive activity loss rules are tested at the taxpayer-level 
(not the CDE level). See Rev. Rul. 2010-16, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (June 28, 2010) 
(ruling that the new markets tax credit will not be a passive activity credit under 
§ 469 in situations where a qualified equity investment in a CDE is not made in 
connection with a trade or business). Although the taxpayer typically owns an 
equity interest in the CDE classified as a partnership interest, the tax credit itself 
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financial institutions.93 
One reason for this is that banks are cash-rich and are 
usually capable of absorbing the tax credits.94 Another reason 
is that non- tax law encourages these investments.95 Specifically, 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requires financial 
institutions to invest in the low-income communities they service.96 
Today, nearly all investment in tax-subsidized affordable housing 
and community development projects comes from financial 
institutions motivated primarily by the CRA.97  
                                                                                                     
does not flow through from the partnership (CDE). See id. (“The CDE does not 
pass through the new markets tax credit to the person claiming the new markets 
tax Credit.”). Rather, under the statute, the tax credit is earned at the 
partner- level when the taxpayer invests in the CDE. See id. (“The amount of the 
new markets tax credit is determined based on a percentage of the amount paid 
to the CDE for the qualified equity investment at its original issue.”). As such, a 
threshold issue is whether the taxpayer acquired the equity interest in the CDE 
in connection with conduct of a trade or business. See id. (stating that determining 
whether the new markets tax credit is disallowed depends on whether the 
acquisition of the qualified equity investment in the CDE arises in connection 
with the conduct of a passive activity in connection with the conduct of a trade or 
business). If so, the passive activity loss rules may apply if the taxpayer does not 
materially participate in that trade or business; nevertheless, the IRS has ruled 
that if the equity interest was not acquired in connection with conduct of a trade 
or business, then the passive activity loss rules will not apply. See id. (“Where an 
individual’s acquisition of a qualified equity investment in a CDE is not in 
connection with the conduct of the individual’s trade or business (or in 
anticipation of the individual’s trade or business), the new markets tax credit 
allowable to an individual under § 45D will not be a passive activity credit under 
§ 469.”). As such, the passive activity loss rules present a potential tripping point 
for natural persons who plan to claim the NMTC, but not an absolute barrier. 
 93. See COHN REZNICK, infra note 98, at 3 (including the nation’s largest 
financial institutions in a survey of the performance of properties financed with 
low-income housing tax credits); ABRAVANEL ET AL., supra note 92, at x (“The 
highest proportion of investors consisted of large international banks or other 
regulated financial institutions.”). 
 94. See JOINT CTR. HOUSE STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 91, at 3 
(stating that widely held corporations, including large financial institutions, can 
use the credits to offset their incomes). 
 95. See Desai et al., supra note 14, at 191 (“The interaction with the CRA 
opens up the possibility that entities may be willing to bid the price of tax credits 
above their actuarially fair value as they can jointly realize tax advantages and 
fulfill CRA obligations.”) 
 96. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2018) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to 
encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities 
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such 
institutions.”). 
 97. See JOINT CTR. HOUSE STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 94, at 4 
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One implication of heavy reliance on CRA-motivated investors 
is that the value of tax credits is linked to the location of major 
financial institutions.98 Financial institutions tend to cluster in 
large urban areas, and in those locations the competition among 
banks for tax credit deals is high.99 This high demand pushes up 
the price of the tax credits, crowding out nonbank competitors and 
rendering developers still more dependent on financial 
institutions.100 Nevertheless, in rural areas with a 
low- concentration of banks, the demand for tax credits is much 
lower—and so are the prices.101 For example, one researcher 
observed that urban investors would pay up to $1.20 per dollar of 
tax credit, while rural investors would pay only $0.85 per dollar for 
those same tax credits.102 This may render the tax credits less 
effective in some markets than others.103 
Second, it is worth noting that financial institutions, 
syndicators and other parties involved with tax equity transactions 
are, in this instance, place entrepreneurs—investors who profit on 
                                                                                                     
(discussing the motivations of large banks as investors). 
 98. See COHN REZNICK, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND ITS EFFECT 
ON HOUSING TAX CREDIT PRICING 7 (2013), 
http://ahic.org/images/downloads/Research_and_Education/the_community_rein
vestment_act_and_its_effect_on_housing_tax.pdf [hereinafter COHN REZNICK] 
(“Cohn Reznick concludes that all else remaining constant, the more the market 
is dominated by CRA-motivated investors who invest only in certain areas of the 
country, the wider the pricing spread one may expect to see between areas with 
intense CRA compliance demand and areas without.”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 99. See Cassandra Jones Havard, The Community Reinvestment Act, Banks, 
and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Investment, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
415, 424 (2017) (“Because the home offices of several large, national banks may 
be geographically close, the CRA assessment areas may overlap. This creates 
extreme competition for tax credits in certain locations.”). 
 100. See COHN REZNICK, supra note 98, at 6 (“Competition for housing tax 
credit investments in areas with limited investment opportunities tends to create 
a massive supply/demand imbalance.”). 
 101. See id. at 7 (comparing tax credit prices in highly sought-after markets 
such as San Francisco and New York with prices in smaller metropolitan areas 
like Indianapolis and Milwaukee). 
 102. See Havard, supra note 99, at 424–25 (describing how the presence of 
large national banks has a deleterious effect on the pricing infrastructure of the 
LIHTC program due to extreme competition for tax credits in certain locations). 
 103. See id. at 425 (stating that although there may be a significant need for 
affordable housing in rural markets, lower tax credits and lack of investors lowers 
supply).  
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place.104 This may be especially relevant in the context of 
community development incentives, because place entrepreneurs 
are likely to prefer investments in areas they expect to gentrify and 
yield significant returns, whereas poor communities may be wary 
of gentrification.105 In this way, the identity of investors may affect 
how the tax incentives ultimately impact communities.106  
b. Fund Model 
The second model of indirect tax subsidies is the fund model. 
Like the tax equity model, the fund model encourages private, 
third-party investment in entities that, in turn, invest in 
low- income communities. But, the mechanism used to encourage 
these investments is distinct. Tax incentives using the fund model 
do not require monetization. Instead, taxpayers are provided a 
current tax benefit when they contribute money to an investment 
vehicle, such as a partnership or corporation, that is required to 
make certain spatially targeted investments. As this section 
explains, the fund model expands the pool of investors beyond CRA 
investors, providing an imperfect answer to one problem presented 
by the tax equity model. 
Specifically, the fund model expands the pool of potential 
investors by presenting tax savings opportunities for taxpayers 
beyond the institutional investors who traditionally participate in 
tax credit monetization transactions. These tax preferences 
encourage investors to pool together relatively small amounts of 
capital from a large number of investors.107 In this way, the funds 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Thomas F. Gieryn, A Space for Place in Sociology, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 
463, 469–70 (2000) (stating that place entrepreneurs aim to extract ever greater 
amounts of exchange value from commodified property). 
 105. See Layser, supra note 22, at 25–26 (tracing the pro-gentrification origins 
of place-based tax incentive programs and conflicts created between 
place  entrepreneurs and poor communities). 
 106. See id (describing the current landscape of place-based investment tax 
incentives and their impact). 
 107. Moreover, the anti-abuse rules that limit individual taxpayers’ ability to 
engage in monetization transactions may present less of a barrier in the context 
of tax incentives adopting the fund model. For example, the passive activity loss 
rules apply to tax losses and credits, but they do not reach tax exemptions like 
those that are available under Opportunity Zones laws. Therefore, the pool of 
potential investors can include individuals in addition to institutional investors. 
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can accumulate enough capital to make large project investments 
without the need for tax equity investors. In this respect, the fund 
model has a significant advantage over the tax equity model; 
however, there are also disadvantages to the approach. 
First, the fund model may present an even larger risk than the 
tax equity model that the interests of investors will conflict with 
the interests of low-income communities.108 The tax equity 
investors described above may be willing to invest in a project that 
is unlikely to yield much economic return because the tax credit 
“purchase” is lucrative once the price is discounted to provide a 
yield.109 They may also be relatively indifferent to the economic 
return because of non-economic motivations, such as the need for 
credit under the CRA.110 In contrast, investors motivated by fund 
model incentives may require real economic returns since the 
value of the tax benefits may be comparatively small.111 As a result, 
investors may press for investments that are most likely to 
maximize profits, regardless of whether those projects also benefit 
poor communities.112 
Second, though the pool of investors is larger under the fund 
model, it is still likely to be limited to a relatively small number of 
                                                                                                     
 108. See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Eickhoff & Carter supra note 14, at 77 (describing how the New 
Markets Tax Credit is transferred to third-party investors at a discounted price 
and in return the investor will receive a seven-year tax credit). 
 110. See COHN REZNICK, supra note 98, at 4 (“[T]he Community Reinvestment 
Act has been an enormously successful vehicle for assembling capital for the 
development of affordable housing”).  
 111. Requirements for tax incentives such as the CRA motivate investors 
under the tax equity model, but investors under the fund model are not motivated 
by tax incentives; rather, they are motivated by actual return on their financial 
investment. Compare Investors, OPPORTUNITY FUND, https://www.opportunity 
fund.org/about/investors/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (“As a Community 
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) certified by the U.S. Treasury 
Department, your investment in Opportunity Fund may qualify for Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice), with Sarah O’Brien, Heard the Buzz About 
Opportunity Zone Funds? Here’s the Skinny, CNBC (Nov. 18, 2018, 10:42 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/31/heard-the-buzz-about-opportunity-zone-funds-
heres-the-skinny.html (describing how funds must be invested in projects within 
the opportunity zone) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice).  
 112. See O’Brien, supra note 111 (“While the new opportunity zone funds 
seem poised to attract investors looking to both minimize their taxes and do it in 
a way that benefits struggling communities, there are skeptics.”). 
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wealthy taxpayers.113 This may be especially true in the context of 
tax incentives like the new Opportunity Zones law that offer 
capital gains tax relief.114 In 2012, well over half of capital gains 
were reported by individual taxpayers who had adjusted gross 
incomes of $1 million or more.115 That same group was responsible 
for only 0.27% of tax returns,116 suggesting that a tiny percentage 
of taxpayers, comprised by some of the wealthiest Americans, have 
the greatest need to shelter capital gains. In short, the potential 
claimants of indirect tax subsidies—whether tax equity investors 
or fund model investors—are both limited and skewed to the very 
wealthy.117  
To summarize, therefore, the first dimension of the typology 
asks whether the tax-based subsidy is delivered directly to 
businesses that are located in (or engage with) low-income areas, 
or whether they are delivered to investors of those businesses.118 
The form of subsidy may affect what parties have the power to 
control which businesses receive the subsidies and whether the 
subsidies are capable of supporting large projects.119 It is 
important to note, at this point, that all investment tax 
                                                                                                     
 113. Cf. O’Brien, supra note 111 (“I think the program is well-intentioned and 
not intended as a giveaway to rich guys or anything like that . . . . But it will be 
hard to measure whether it’s working or not.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. See infra notes 219–221 and accompanying text. 
 115. SOI Tax Stats-Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Tax 
Returns, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-sales-of-capital-assets-
reported-on-individual-tax-returns (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (showing that 
50.32% of short-term capital gains and 63.75% of long-term capital gains were 
reported by taxpayers with adjusted gross income greater than $1 million in 2012) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 116. See id. (showing that taxpayers with an adjusted gross income greater 
than $1 million in 2012 accounted for 288,555 out of the 10,856,594 tax returns 
with short-term capital gain or loss reported). 
 117. See Aaron Waites & Jason Walker, Qualified Opportunity Zones: What 
Investors Should Know, WELLS FARGO (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/the-private-bank/insights/planning/wpu-qualified-
opportunity-zones/ (advising on wealth planning that “[i]f you are facing 
significant tax payments as a result of capital gains, investing in a Qualified 
Opportunity Zone Fund may be worth exploring”) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 118. See supra Part II.A (describing the two-dimensional typology to describe 
categories of place-based investment tax incentives). 
 119. Compare Part II.A.1 (discussing characteristics of direct tax subsidies), 
with Part II.A.2 (distinguishing characteristics of indirect tax subsidies). 
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incentives—regardless of whether they are place-based—can be 
designed in either direct or indirect forms. The second dimension, 
which is described in the next section, looks specifically at the 
spatial component of place-based investment tax incentives.120 
B. The Second Dimension: Space versus Community 
The second dimension of the typology focuses on the spatial 
component of place-based investment tax incentives.121 To fully 
understand how tax law—or any law—targets place, it is 
important to understand the nature of that target.122 A “place” can 
be defined abstractly as a location in space that not only has 
natural and built physical forms like rivers, buildings and streets, 
but also has a social interpretation.123 The social interpretation is 
what makes a place a home, a school, a church, a playground—or 
a neighborhood, like those targeted by place-based investment tax 
incentives.124 
A neighborhood connotes a geographic location with material 
form—natural and built environments—that is interpreted, 
named, and given meaning and value by the people who live and 
invest there.125 Specifically, a neighborhood is an interpretation of 
                                                                                                     
 120. See supra Part II.B (discussing whether tax law prioritizes profitability 
of space or whether it prioritizes improved neighborhood conditions for the benefit 
of the community that lives in that space.) 
 121. See generally EDWARD L. GLASSER, THE ECONOMICS OF LOCATION-BASED 
TAX INCENTIVES (Harv. Inst. Econ. Research Oct. 29, 2001) (“In general, I argue 
that tax incentives will generally lead to more efficient locational decisions.”). 
 122. See infra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Gieryn, supra note 104, at 464–66 (describing the relationship 
between geographic location, material form, and investment with meaning or 
value). Stated differently, where space itself is a geometric concept based on 
metrics like distance, direction, size and shape, place can be understood as a space 
filled with people, practices, objects and representation. See id. at 465 (“Space is 
what place becomes when the unique gathering of things, meanings, and values 
are sucked out.”). 
 124. See HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, LEARNING FROM OPPORTUNITY 
ZONES: HOW TO IMPROVE PLACE-BASED POLICIES 10 (2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Looney_Opportunity-
Zones_final.pdf (“The geographic targeting of incentives is crucial for determining 
whether place-based incentives are effective and benefit residents of distressed 
areas.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 125. See Gieryn, supra note 104, at 465 (defining the neighborhood by 
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place that references a space filled with the following elements: 
Physical structures (e.g., buildings, roads, parks, public spaces); 
neighbors (e.g., people who may be rich or poor, integrated or 
segregated, home owners or renters, employed or unemployed, 
married or unmarried, politically powerful or politically 
marginalized); resources (e.g., service agencies and nonprofits, 
stores and groceries, transportation); and local institutions (e.g., 
schools, churches, libraries, hospitals, police and fire stations, 
major businesses).126 
Scholars have articulated a variety of theories to describe the 
subject of geographic study in ways that account for the 
combination of locational characteristics, on the one hand, and 
social meaning, on the other.127 Among these are theories that 
distinguish between space and place.128 In a study of distressed 
communities and community business entrepreneurship, business 
scholar Harvey Johnstone and geographer Doug Lionais explained 
the complexity of areas labeled as “depleted communities:”129 
Depleted communities are manifestations of uneven 
development. They are communities where the economy is in 
decline and the resources of the area, according to profit-seeking 
capital, are ‘used up.’ However, depleted communities are more 
than simply locations that lack growth mechanisms; they are 
also areas to which people retain an attachment. A depleted 
community, therefore, continues to exist as a social entity 
                                                                                                     
adopting a definition of place, set forth by sociologist Thomas Gieryn, as 
comprised of three prongs: Geographic location, material form, and investment 
with meaning and value).  
 126. See id. (defining “place” as comprised of geographic location (e.g. “your 
favorite armchair, a room, building, neighborhood, district, village, city, county, 
metropolitan region”), material form (e.g. “physicality, whether built or natural—
a compilation of things or objects at some particular spot in the universe”), and 
an investment with meaning and value). 
 127. See, e.g., B.S. Morgan, Social Geography, Spatial Structure and Social 
Structure, 9(3) GEOJOURNAL 301, 301 (1984) (“[S]patial structure is largely a 
reflection of aspects of social structure.”). 
 128. See Harvey Johnstone & Doug Lionais, Depleted Communities and 
Community Business Entrepreneurship: Revaluing Space Through Place, 16 
ENTREPRENEUR REG. DEV. 217, 217 (May 2004) (“Depleted communities . . . can be 
seen as areas that have lost much of their economic rationale as space, while 
retaining high attachments and social relations of place.”). 
 129. See id. (arguing “that depleted communities can act as hosts to a unique 
form of enterprise that combines good business practices with community goals”). 
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because it is shaped by positive social forces as well as by 
negative economic forces.130 
For this reason, Johnstone and Lionais distinguish between space, 
which is “the location of profitable enterprise,” and place, which is 
“the location of social life.”131 This second dimension of the typology 
draws upon these theories about space and place to describe the 
spatial component of place-based investment tax incentives.  
Specifically, the second dimension asks whether the tax law 
prioritizes improved profitability within a space, or whether it 
prioritizes improved neighborhood conditions for the benefit of 
community residents. Tax laws that prioritize profitability are 
referred to as spatially-oriented, a description that maps on to 
Johnstone and Lionais’s definition of space.132 In contrast, tax laws 
that prioritize improved neighborhood conditions, such as by 
addressing environmental needs of community residents, are 
referred to here as community-oriented. This latter description 
corresponds to Johnstone and Lionais’ definition of place.133 
Stated differently, legislators must choose whether to use tax 
incentives to improve the economic and physical conditions within 
spatial boundaries—regardless of how those changes impact 
communities—or to use tax incentives to improve how community 
members experience those conditions.134 This decision, in 
particular, may have a notable impact on the tax laws’ effect on 
poor residents. This is because, at minimum, community-oriented 
conceptions of place include safeguards to protect poor residents 
from harms associated with neighborhood change, while 
spatially-oriented investment tax incentives lack such features. 
Place-based investment tax incentives can be sorted along this 
dimension by assessing whether they include safeguards for local 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 218. 
 131. Id. at 219 (separating the ideas of space from place can help determine 
how depleted communities can improve responsiveness to new business 
development). 
 132. See id. at 218 (“[S]pace . . . is an economic (capitalistic) evaluation of 
location based on its capacity for profit.”). 
 133. See id. (“[P]lace . . . is a social evaluation of location based on meaning.”). 
 134. This choice mirrors the debate between traditional place-based programs 
and people-oriented place-based programs. See, e.g., Amy T. Khare, Putting 
People Back into Place-Based Public Policies, 37 J. URB. AFF. 47, 49 (2015) 
(contrasting policies that implicitly prioritize “spatial conceptions of community” 
to programs that “invest in groups of people who live in areas being targeted”). 
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residents, whether they are designed to encourage firms to engage 
with the community, and whether their objective is clearly to 
benefit local residents.135 The remainder of this section will 
elaborate on this dimension, focusing not only on what can be 
observed in the current landscape of place-based investment tax 
incentives, but also on ideal characteristics. 
1. Spatially-Oriented Tax Incentives 
In the most general sense, a tax incentive can be described as 
spatially-oriented if it promotes investments within geographic 
boundaries with the sole purpose of maximizing economic growth 
within that area. For example, the incentives may be designed to 
encourage new businesses to locate in a low-income area, or they 
may be designed to help existing businesses expand. They may 
encourage developers to site projects in a particular neighborhood. 
They may include incentives for businesses to create jobs or 
rehabilitate housing. 
Any of these activities may, under the right circumstances, 
benefit local residents. But spatially-oriented incentives leave 
their impact on residents entirely to chance.136 Tax subsidized 
businesses may create jobs, or they may invest instead in new 
computer technology.137 When they create jobs, the tax subsidized 
businesses may hire local residents, or they may employ 
commuters from other parts of the region.138 Tax subsidized 
developers may rehabilitate dilapidated housing to create new, 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Layser, supra note 22, at 68–69 (setting forth the following three 
principles for designing community-oriented investment tax incentives: Confer 
power to community members; link place to community; and include clear and 
measurable objectives). 
 136. See infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text for examples of how 
businesses that receive spatially-oriented incentives use the financial benefit to 
impact entities other than local communities. 
 137. See generally Daniel G. Garrett, et al., NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., Tax 
Policy and Local Labor Market Behavior, NBER Working Paper No. 25546 (Feb. 
2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25546 (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 138. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (“I find some evidence that 
investment subsidized under the NMTC program reduces poverty and 
unemployment rates in relatively low-income census tracts”).  
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higher-quality affordable housing in the area, or they may create 
condominiums for a higher-income demographic.139  
The key feature of spatially-oriented tax incentives is the 
absence of safeguards for poor communities.140 To analyze whether 
a place-based investment tax incentive is spatially-oriented, the 
key inquiry is whether the law contains features to increase the 
likelihood that that poor residents in a targeted area will benefit.141 
A variety of factors are relevant to the analysis.142 Three factors 
that tend to suggest that an incentive is spatially-oriented are the 
following: (1) very broad or undefined categories of eligible 
investments;143 (2) general incentives to invest in human capital 
through hiring or job training;144 and (3) taxpayer eligibility 
requirements based solely on the location of the taxpayer.145 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Mark L. Joseph, Is Mixed-Income Development an Antidote to Urban 
Poverty?, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 212–13 (2006) (describing the 
displacement of poor tenants whose buildings were replaced with mixed income 
units). 
 140. In approaching this inquiry, one should keep separate the empirical 
question of what kind of investments the tax incentives tend to subsidize from the 
issue of what kind of investments they are permitted to subsidize. It is at least 
theoretically possible that, even without safeguards for poor communities, 
investors may use the tax incentives to subsidize investment that benefit poor 
communities. However, even if these tax incentives were proven to consistently 
benefit poor communities, their design would still be spatially-oriented due to the 
lack of safeguards. Such empirical results would merely suggest that 
spatially-oriented tax incentives may be effective anti-poverty tools, and that 
safeguards for the poor would be unnecessary for tax incentives used for this 
purpose.  
 141. See Helen F. Ladd, Spatially Targeted Economic Development Strategies: 
Do They Work?, CITYSCAPE 193, 195 (“A more direct approach to dealing with 
pockets of urban distress in urban areas involves using place-specific assistance 
to help the residents—especially the disadvantaged residents—of distressed 
urban areas.”). 
 142. See, e.g., infra notes 146–156 and accompanying text (describing the 
factors suggesting a spatially-oriented incentive). 
 143. See infra notes 146–148 and accompanying text (explaining how broad 
or undefined categories of eligible investments fail to assure that investments 
benefit poor communities). 
 144. See infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (explaining how general 
job hiring or training requirements fail to assure that investments benefit poor 
communities). 
 145. See infra notes 153–156 and accompanying text (explaining how 
eligibility requirements based solely on location fail to assure that investments 
benefit poor communities). 
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First, broad or undefined categories of eligible investments 
suggest a spatial-orientation because they allow market 
participants to determine the specific types of investments to be 
subsidized, and there is no assurance that profit-seeking investors 
will choose investments that benefit poor communities.146 To the 
contrary, the interests of place-entrepreneurs—investors who 
profit through place-based investments—often conflict with the 
needs of local communities.147 To avoid such results, a law may 
require certifications from project developers or include 
mechanisms to monitor outcomes.148 The failure to include any 
such features suggests the law is spatially-oriented. 
Second, general incentives to invest in human capital tend to 
suggest a spatial-orientation because they encourage businesses to 
develop their workforce in the way they deem most profitable, 
without regard to whether area residents benefit.149 In other 
words, general incentives to hire employees do not encourage 
businesses to hire residents, and businesses may well look to 
commuters to meet their hiring needs.150 When this happens, poor 
residents may be passed over for jobs.151 In addition, they may 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Gieryn, supra note 104, at 470 (discussing how local investors 
“sometimes face resistance from community organizers more concerned about the 
use-value of place, who oppose growth because of its detrimental consequences for 
neighborhood quality of life or environmental health”). 
 147. The fact that the government requires monitoring of local outcomes 
resulting from investments indicates that investors have alternative motivations 
for investing, other than community benefits. Cf. CONG. RES. SERV., TAX 
INCENTIVES FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IN BRIEF 7 (Nov. 20, 2018) (“NMTC 
recipients are required to adhere to a set of outcome-based reporting and 
compliance requirements. These metrics track the location and type of projects 
funded by NMTC allocations.”). 
 148. See id. (describing the reporting requirements for recipients of 
Opportunity Zones tax incentives that tract outcomes for local communities). 
 149.  See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (“Although place-based policies 
have grown in importance in recent decades, many remain skeptical of their 
efficacy. Lending credence to this skepticism are numerous studies on programs 
such as state EZs that suggest that there is little to no benefit associated with 
subsidizing investment in struggling cities and neighborhoods.”). 
 150. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (suggesting that place-based 
incentives may not look to local residents in their hiring, meaning the local 
communities do not experience any job prospect improvement). 
 151. Cf. Rikha Sharma Rani, Avoiding Gentrification, How to Use 
Opportunity Zones to Benefit Communities, FUSE CORPS (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://fusecorps.org/2019/02/12/avoiding-gentrification-how-to-use-opportunity-
zones-to-benefit-communities/ (“Public investments can also help ensure that 
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suffer further harm if commuting outsiders move into the area and 
displace residents through gentrification.152 
Third, taxpayer eligibility requirements based solely on the 
location of the taxpayer suggest a spatial-orientation because they 
help ensure that the targeted area will become a profit center, but 
they do not require engagement with the community.153 Location 
requirements may help ensure that residents gain the benefit of a 
local business or that investors improve the environment in their 
community.154 As such, most place-based investment tax 
incentives should—and do—include location among the eligibility 
criteria.155 However, merely locating in an area is insufficient to 
ensure engagement with local residents. Without some 
requirement that the businesses engage with the local community 
in some way, eligibility based on location likely belies a 
spatially-oriented tax incentive.156 
To a large degree, analyzing whether a tax incentive is 
spatially-oriented involves the task of proving a negative: The 
                                                                                                     
residents and business owners are prepared for opportunity zone 
projects . . . . Officials are also on the lookout for opportunities to enhance local 
participation in projects.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 152. See id. (“In some urban areas, for example, where gentrification has 
already priced out long-time residents, investments could exacerbate the issue 
and displace even more of the people meant to benefit from the incentives.”). 
 153. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 147 (“[T]o become eligible for a NMTC 
allocation, a certified CDE must, among other criteria, have a primary mission of 
serving or providing investment capital to low-income communities. A governing 
or advisory board is supposed to hold the CDE accountable to that mission.”) 
 154. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 147 (“QOFs are not required to be 
mission-oriented for the primary purposes of serving low-income communities or 
persons.”). 
 155. See infra Appendix C (showing that all but two states that have current 
enterprise zone programs require the taxpayer’s business or property to be located 
in the enterprise zone). 
 156. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 147, at 1 (explaining that Opportunity 
Zone tax incentives, for example require investment in a qualified low-income 
community but does not require any additional engagement within the 
community); see also Lorraine Mirabella, Hogan Proposes $56.5 Million to Spur 
Development and Business Creation in Maryland 'Opportunity Zones', BALT. SUN 
(Jan. 3, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-hogan-
opportunity-zone-state-invesmtment-20190103-story.html (stating that some 
states have implemented grant programs that provide training programs for 
residents of these zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
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absence of features expressly linking benefits to the local 
community.157 This task is made especially difficult by the rarity 
of community-oriented incentives to serve as a foil.158 
Nevertheless, the current legal landscape does include multiple 
imperfect examples of community-oriented tax incentives that 
contrast with spatially-oriented incentives, thereby helping to 
guide the inquiry. The next section will elaborate upon the 
characteristics of community-oriented tax incentives. 
2. Community-Oriented Tax Incentives 
A tax incentive is community-oriented if it includes features 
that help ensure that residents will benefit from the 
investments.159 In other words, where spatially-oriented tax 
incentives promote economic growth within a space without any 
safeguard for local communities, community-oriented tax 
incentives seek to improve neighborhood conditions for the benefit 
of community residents. Ideally, they would be designed or 
implemented with input from community residents; they would 
maintain the link between community members and the targeted 
place; and they would articulate clear objectives and include a 
mechanism for monitoring outcomes.160  
Under current law, few (if any) tax incentives embody the 
ideal. The key feature of community-oriented investment tax 
incentives is the inclusion of safeguards to help increase the 
chances that poor communities will benefit from the tax law. 
Unlike their spatially-oriented counterparts, community-oriented 
investment tax incentives do not leave their impact on poor 
                                                                                                     
 157. See supra notes 146, 149, and accompanying text (describing factors that 
must seek to discover the absence of local impact generated by spatially-oriented 
incentives); supra note 156 and accompanying text (same). 
 158. See Part III.B (discussing the spatial component of place-based 
investment tax incentives). 
 159. See Khare, supra note 134 (criticizing the history of federal investment 
into urban neighborhoods in ways that overtly prioritize change to the spatial 
environment—these communities as places—while leaving unresolved the 
conflicts over how the communities of people living there are intended to benefit). 
 160. See Layser, supra note 22, at 68 (“Though these principles should guide 
the design of any community oriented investment tax incentives, the specifics 
may vary widely as different communities seek to address their unique 
circumstances.”).  
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communities entirely to chance.161 Instead, they are designed with 
the specific goal of benefiting poor communities, and they include 
features specifically for this purpose.162 The presence of such 
features is sufficient to designate a tax law as community-oriented, 
regardless of whether such safeguards ultimately prove effective. 
In other words, the empirical question of impact should be 
separate from the inquiry into whether the tax law is designed as 
a community-oriented incentive. Even ideal models of 
community-oriented investment tax incentives may sometimes fail 
to benefit the community.163 This is because community-oriented 
investment tax incentives, like all place-based policies, are likely 
to be constrained by mobility effects.164 In other words, people are 
mobile, and neighborhood conditions may affect who comes and 
goes from the community, regardless of whether the law includes 
safeguards.165 For example, instead of displacement through 
gentrification, community-oriented tax incentives may increase 
the likelihood of voluntary exiting of the community.166 
To see why, consider incentives that specifically encourage 
businesses to hire community residents. If successful, there is a 
risk that residents may become more mobile, and less willing to 
remain in an otherwise distressed neighborhood, as their economic 
                                                                                                     
 161. See id. at 68 (“The primary goal of any community oriented investment 
tax incentive should be to improve neighborhood conditions in poor 
communities.”).  
 162. See id. at 18 (“At a minimum, a community oriented investment must 
include some safeguard to prevent poor residents from being harmed, while 
spatially oriented investment tax incentives lack such safeguards.”).  
 163. See id. at 68 (“[I]t is difficult to find examples of pure, community 
oriented investment tax incentives under current law.”). 
 164. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and 
Community Development Policy Essay, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 2 
(2009) (“[E]very public investment in a given place not only has a direct impact 
on the people in that place but more importantly shapes the incentives that people 
have to remain, leave, avoid, or move to that place.”). Focusing on gentrification, 
Davidson points out that place-based strategies like investment tax incentives 
“change[] the underlying incentive structure for individual mobility, making 
displacement—and its associated harms—an enduring risk.” Id. at 8. 
 165. See id. at 8. (“People move or stay based on the resources they have as 
well as the opportunities they can access, and mobility programs directly target 
resource questions.”).  
 166. See id. (discussing how the resources that a person has access to affects 
their decision to stay in or leave their community).  
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conditions improve.167 If those residents leave, they may harm the 
community they left behind, potentially exacerbating concentrated 
poverty.168 However, other factors may help mitigate this risk. 
First, the social context that helps give meaning to places and 
communities also serves as an anchor.169 Within economically 
distressed communities, the “emotional bonds and [ ] social 
benefits of living there create a powerful resistance to leaving.”170 
Those same ties would continue to exist even as community 
members become more mobile, helping to keep those people within 
the community even as they become more economically stable.171  
Second, the risk that residents will leave may be mitigated 
through other types of investment in the community, such as 
improvements to the built environment or the expansion of area 
businesses that meet specific community needs. Such 
improvements are, after all, often an important component to 
improving neighborhood conditions,172 and they may affect 
whether community members are willing to remain even as their 
                                                                                                     
 167. See id. at 7 (“As people move, the social fabric of a community can be 
damaged by the loss of certain members and a strategy that incentivizes that 
movement can have direct consequences on the communities from which people 
are escaping.”).  
 168. See id. (discussing how this can further isolate those not able or 
unwilling to leave). One theory that has been advanced to explain the causes of 
concentrated poverty is the class-selective migration of middle- and working-class 
blacks out of poor neighborhoods; however, Douglas Massey and his colleagues 
disputed this theory, concluding that patterns of out-migration from poor ghetto 
areas had relatively little to do with the accumulation of poverty in black 
neighborhoods. See Douglas S. Massey, Andrew B. Gross & Kumiko Shibuya, 
Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty, 59 AM. SOC. 
REV. 425, 433 (1994) (“Rather, our results suggest that the geographic 
concentration of poor blacks is caused by the residential segregation of 
African- Americans in urban housing markets.”).  
 169. See Johnstone and Lionais, supra note 128, at 218 (“[D]epleted 
communities are more than simply locations that lack growth mechanisms; they 
are also areas to which people retain an attachment.”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Davidson, supra note 164, at 7 (discussing how the movement of 
certain individuals out of the community can damage the community’s social 
fabric). This same phenomenon has been noted as a restraint on mobility 
programs that depend on voucher-holding residents choosing to leave their 
communities in search of higher-opportunity neighborhoods.  
 172. See Johnstone and Lionais, supra note 128, at 217 (“While conditions in 
depleted communities can limit possibilities for traditional development, 
entrepreneurial responses are not similarly constrained.”).  
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economic position stabilizes.173 To be sure, such improved 
conditions may also serve to attract higher-income clientele, 
thereby presenting a risk of gentrification.174 But again, such risk 
may not be as high as it seems, particularly if the laws are used to 
target areas with a high concentration of poverty—over 40% 
poverty rate175—which may be less likely to gentrify, at least in the 
near term. In other words, we will not know to what extent that 
mobility effects limit the efficacy of community-oriented 
incentives, notwithstanding their safeguards, until such tax laws 
are studied empirically.  
To analyze whether a place-based investment tax incentive is 
community-oriented, then, the core inquiry mirrors that of 
spatially-oriented incentives: Ask whether the tax law contains 
features to increase the likelihood that poor residents in the 
targeted area will benefit. Here, three factors that tend to suggest 
that an incentive is community-oriented are: Relatively narrow or 
defined categories of eligible investments of a variety that is likely 
to benefit poor communities; incentives to invest in workforce 
development for the benefit of residents of targeted communities; 
and taxpayer eligibility requirements based on the extent to which 
the taxpayer engages with community residents. 
First, relatively narrow or defined categories of eligible 
investments may be used to limit the scope of eligible investments 
to those most likely to benefit poor communities. Such constraints 
on eligible investments can serve as a safeguard for the targeted 
community by making it less likely that the incentive will 
subsidize businesses that primarily benefit higher-income 
populations. As explained in Part III.B.2 below, this feature is rare 
under current law.176 
                                                                                                     
 173. See id. at 229 (discussing how entrepreneurs can use certain assets 
within depleted communities to motivate the community’s residents to remain).  
 174. See Davidson, supra note 164, at 9 (“As communities become more 
desirable, more affluent residents are drawn in.”).  
 175. See Andrew Jordan Greenlee, A Relational Analysis of Mobility Within 
Illinois’ Housing Choice Voucher 27 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Chicago) (“[A] poverty rate of 40 percent tends to correlate 
strongly with other indicators of disadvantage and lack of opportunity.”).  
 176. See infra Part III. B.2 (discussing examples of community-oriented 
investment tax incentives that exist under current law and pertinent studies).  
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Second, tax incentives to invest in workforce development may 
be community-oriented if they specifically encourage the taxpayer 
to hire or train poor residents of targeted communities. Such a 
requirement can serve as a safeguard against the possibility that 
new jobs ultimately inure to outsiders. For example, as explained 
in Part III.B.1 below, some states provide incentives to hire 
community residents.177  
Third, tax incentives may be community-oriented if, instead of 
focusing on a taxpayer’s location as the sole eligibility criteria, the 
tax incentive makes engagement with residents an eligibility 
requirement. This factor looks to the location of community 
residents, and the extent to which the taxpayer engages with those 
residents, as indicative of a community-orientation. This is 
because such incentives do not treat the targeted place as an 
economic space, where economic activity must occur entirely 
within its boundaries, but rather as the location of a community 
that should be targeted for benefits. For example, as explained in 
Part III.B.1178 below, Texas provides hiring tax credits to firms—
from any location—that hire from three pools of employees, one of 
which includes those who reside within zones.179 
In sum, on the broadest level, lawmakers must decide whether 
to target spaces—geographic boundaries where businesses or 
property must locate—or communities, which exist within such 
places, giving them social meaning. This choice is revealed through 
the decision to include safeguards for local communities, or to 
exclude them, and it must be made regardless of whether the tax 
law is structured as a direct or indirect tax subsidy. The next Part 
will use the two-by-two typology to identify four basic categories of 
place-based investment tax incentives, and it will revisit empirical 
studies within this framework.  
                                                                                                     
 177. See infra Part III. B.1 (discussing community-oriented tax incentives in 
several states).  
 178. See id. (discussing Texas’s enterprise zone law and how it benefits 
economically-disadvantaged residents).  
 179. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (West 2019) (providing that 
businesses outside of the enterprise zone are eligible for benefits if 35% of their 
newly created positions are held by residents of an enterprise zone, veterans, or 
economically-disadvantaged persons). The other two categories are veterans or 
economically disadvantaged persons. See infra Part III. B.1 (discussing 
community-oriented tax incentives in several states).  
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III. Application of the Typology 
The previous Part described two dimensions by which place-
based investment tax incentives can be analyzed. The next step is 
to use the two-by-two typology to identify four types of place-based 
investment tax incentives characterized along these two 
dimensions: (1) spatially-oriented direct tax incentives; 
(2) spatially-oriented indirect tax incentives; 
(3) community-oriented direct tax incentives; 
(4) community-oriented indirect tax incentives.  
In connection with this project, I surveyed the state enterprise 
zone laws for all states that currently have enterprise zone laws,180 
plus a variety of federal laws (the New Markets Tax Credit,181 the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit,182 and Opportunity Zones183). 
The survey revealed only a handful of examples of features that 
reflect community approaches to targeting place.184 The table 
below provides examples of each type, which are explained in 
greater detail in this Part. 
                                                                                                     
 180. See generally Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax 
Incentives Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise 
Zone Tax Incentives (Working Paper, May 1, 2019). 
 181. I.R.C. § 45D (2018). 
 182. I.R.C. § 42 (2018). 
 183. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018). 
 184. See infra Appendices A–C. 






















Some state tax credit 
programs 
 
A. Spatially-Oriented Tax Incentives 
1. Direct Tax Incentives 
Most tax incentives included in state enterprise zone laws are 
spatially-oriented direct tax incentives. First, the incentives are 
properly characterized as direct tax subsidies because the tax 
preference available through these programs are claimed directly 
by the eligible businesses, not by investors.185 Second, most—but 
not all—enterprise zone tax incentives lack safeguards for 
community residents and include factors that tend to indicate a 
spatially-oriented incentive.186 
                                                                                                     
 185. See Layser, supra note 22, at 17 (“[I]f a business is entitled to a tax break 
because it expands its activities in a low-income community, then the tax law 
provides a direct tax subsidy to that business.”).  
 186. See id. at 38–39 (“The pro-gentrification origins of enterprise zone laws 
help explain the dominance of spatially oriented investment tax incentives that 
do not include any safeguards for poor communities.”).  
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 Specifically, enterprise zone laws often have broad 
descriptions of eligible businesses.187 Many states limit the subsidy 
to certain types of businesses, such as manufacturers and 
producers,188 but there is little indication that such businesses are 
categorically more likely to benefit community residents, and the 
laws rarely require eligible taxpayers to engage with the 
community.189 The tax incentive package available to those 
businesses varies by state, but in most cases, it includes some 
combination of capital and labor incentives.190 However, the labor 
incentives usually take the form of general incentives to invest in 
human capital through hiring or job training, and they rarely 
require firms to hire local residents.191 And in almost all cases, 
eligibility is based at least partially upon the location of the firm 
within zone boundaries, regardless of the firm’s level of 
engagement with the community.192  
 Many empirical studies have sought to measure the 
impact of enterprise zone laws, providing some insight into how 
spatially-oriented direct tax incentives affect poor communities.193 
                                                                                                     
 187. See infra Appendix A (showing that 18/33 state enterprise zone laws 
have broad or undefined descriptions of eligible investment types). 
 188. See infra Appendix A (showing that 11/33 state enterprise zone laws 
include incentives that promote manufacturing or production activities).  
 189. See infra Appendix C (showing that only 10/33 state enterprise zone laws 
require taxpayers to engage with poor communities, and of those, only seven 
include incentives to specifically engage with zone residents); see also Layser, 
supra note 22, at 55 (“Spatially oriented investment tax incentives are inefficient 
to the extent that they encourage businesses to engage in tax-motivated behaviors 
that do not correct a market failure.”).  
 190. See Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise Zone Tax 
Incentives (Working Paper, May 1, 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3381243 (presenting a multi-state survey of 
state enterprise zone laws that shows the mix of capital and labor investments 
included in most state enterprise zone incentive packages). 
 191. See id. (“Some states mandate that to collect credits, a certain percentage 
of the company’s new hires must be zone residents . . . .”); see also infra Appendix 
B (showing that 19/33 state enterprise zone programs include incentives to invest 
in human capital without including any specific incentive to target zone 
residents). 
 192. See Layser, supra note 190 (“In addition to being located within the 
zone's boundaries, a company may be required to create new jobs or make a 
substantial capital investment within a zone.”). 
 193. See generally Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11; Hanson, supra note 12; 
Elvery, supra note 12. 
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Most of these studies have focused solely on economic indicators 
like unemployment rates, poverty rates, and property values 
within enterprise zones.194 Of these, job creation is most likely to 
be cited as a reason for introducing spatially-oriented direct tax 
incentives;195 however, the empirical support has been mixed, at 
best. One study found that enterprise zones “had, at best, no effect 
on employment and, at worst, a small negative effect” in some 
areas, noting that “zone residents were less likely to be employed 
than residents of observationally similar areas.”196 
 Several other studies have also noted that the effect of 
enterprise zones on unemployment rates is uneven, and they have 
often concluded that gains in one zone tend to be offset by losses in 
another.197 For example, one study found the average effect of 
enterprise zone incentives on zone employment rates to be “near 
zero, evidence of variation in the effects of enterprise zones [that] 
could suggest that some enterprise zones increase employment, 
while others decrease it.”198 Another study concluded that 
“although enterprise zone incentives affect job creation positively, 
they also increase job destruction, leading to a negligible or 
negative impact, on average.”199 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing the effect of 
enterprise zones on employment); see also Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 
(discussing the effect of enterprise zones on property value); Elvery, supra note 
12, at 57 (discussing the effect of enterprise zones on employment). One can easily 
imagine other relevant metrics, such as health outcomes, crime rates, or 
educational performance; however, such studies are rare in the existing 
literature. 
 195. See Hanson, supra note 12, at 722 (“The majority of past analyses of 
geographically-targeted tax incentives study programs initiated at the state l, and 
focuses on how these programs affect employment outcomes.”).  
 196. See Elvery, supra note 12, at 57 (discussing enterprise zones in 
California and Florida). 
 197. See Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11, at 13, 24; see also Robert T. 
Greenbaum & John B. Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban 
Manufacturing Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 315, 315 (2004) 
(discussing the positive and negative effects of enterprise zones on employment).  
 198. Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11, at 13, 24. 
 199. Greenbaum & Engberg, supra note 197, at 315; see Bondonio & 
Greenbaum, supra note 11, at 133 (“The results indicate that positive 
zone-induced increases in employment, sales, and capital expenditures in new 
and existing establishments are offset by zone-induced losses among firms that 
close or leave the zone area.”). 
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Evidence about these types of tax incentives’ effect on poverty 
rates is similarly mixed.200 One study observed that some 
enterprise zones experienced decreased poverty rates, but overall 
found no statistically significant effect on neighborhood 
demographics.201 Another study found a reduction of poverty rate 
in enterprise zones using some statistical models, but no effect 
with others.202 These studies suggest that the effect of these tax 
laws on poverty rates has also been negligible. Meanwhile little 
evidence exists about other possible demographic changes in 
targeted neighborhoods. 
The most consistent finding with respect to spatially-oriented 
direct investment tax incentives is increased property values.203 
Several studies have observed that property values increase in 
targeted areas.204 Though it may be impossible to know for sure 
who benefits from increased property values, some researchers 
have observed that it is “likely that geographically-targeted tax 
incentives and grants benefit land owners,” which is more likely to 
include landlords than homeowners.205 In other words, landlords 
may be able to capitalize enterprise zone tax credits into rent 
                                                                                                     
 200. Compare Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394 (finding an increase 
in the poverty rate), with Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (finding a reduction of 
poverty rate in enterprise zones using some statistical models, but no effect with 
others). 
 201. See Deirdre Oakley & Hui-Shien Tsao, A New Way of Revitalizing 
Distressed Urban Communities? Assessing the Impact of the Federal 
Empowerment Zone Program, 28 J. URB. AFFS. 443, 465 (2006) (explaining the 
study’s findings). 
 202. See Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (explaining the results of the Busso 
and Kline and HUD testing).  
 203. See Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394 (stating that one result of 
the EZ designation is as much as a 25% increase in median home value); see also 
Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (stating that Krupka and Noonan found increased 
median property value in designated areas).  
 204. See Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394 (stating how the MSA study 
also showed an increase in property value).  
 205. Hanson, supra note 12, at 730; see Stephen Billings, Do Enterprise Zones 
Work?: An Analysis at the Borders, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 68, 87 (2009) (noting that 
“landowners are able to capitalize these tax credits into rents”). 
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increases,206 potentially to the detriment of community 
residents.207 
In sum, most studies of place-based investment tax incentives 
to date have focused on the impact of spatially-oriented direct tax 
incentives. The results of these studies have been mixed, at best, 
suggesting that this type of tax incentive may be ineffective for 
anti-poverty goals. The next section will identify examples of 
indirect tax incentives under current law and will explain what we 
know—and what we do not yet know—about their impact. 
2. Indirect Tax Incentives 
Spatially-oriented indirect tax incentives are the most 
common form of federal place-based investment tax incentives. 
The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) is a clear example of this 
type of tax incentive.208 The NMTC is claimed by third parties who 
                                                                                                     
 206. See Billings, supra note 205, at 87 (explaining how the landowners can 
use the tax credit to charge a high rent, so the business owners do not get the 
benefit of the tax credit). 
 207. See DAVID CHRISTAFORE & SUSANE LEGUIZAMON, NEIGHBORHOOD 
INEQUALITY SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF GENTRIFICATION 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12405 (explaining how rent hikes that develop 
through revitalization programs can displace the poor) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 208. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (explaining how the tax credit is based on the 
location). Note that the federal LIHTC arguably also includes spatially-oriented 
indirect tax incentives. See supra note 83 (stating the LIHTC does not directly 
target low income areas, but does increase the tax credit depending on location). 
In some respects, the LIHTC is not a place-based investment tax incentive as 
contemplated by this typology. That is because, although the LIHTC serves to 
subsidize physical structures, the law does not specify where LIHTC projects 
must be located. In this regard, the LIHTC is place-neutral. However, the LIHTC 
does contain two place-based components in Qualified Census Tracts and Difficult 
Development Areas. See I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B) (2018) (stating two place-based 
components are qualified census tracts and difficult development areas). Both of 
these provisions define geographic areas where projects are eligible for larger tax 
subsidies than projects located elsewhere. The QCT and DDA provisions increase 
the profitability of projects located in high poverty areas, ostensibly to offset the 
heightened risk and expense incurred by development in those areas. And since 
the LIHTC is used to subsidize affordable housing projects that benefit poor 
tenants, it may be tempting to classify the LIHTC as a community-oriented 
indirect tax incentive; however, the LIHTC is more properly classified as a 
spatially-oriented incentive for several reasons. First, there is no reason to think 
that new or rehabilitated affordable housing in a QCT or DDA will benefit 
community residents. To the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that such 
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invest in entities that, in turn, invest in targeted places.209 In 
targeting place, the NMTC adopts a spatially-oriented approach.210 
Specifically, the law permits a broad range of investment types.211 
The primary statutory criteria is the location of businesses and 
projects within the geographic boundaries of the targeted areas.212 
Although specific projects must be approved by the CDFI Fund 
through a competitive application process, the statute does not 
require that projects benefit the local communities or involve 
community stakeholders.213 The broad definition of eligible 
investments, which turns primarily on the location of the 
investment, reflects a spatial-orientation.  
As in the case of spatially-oriented direct tax incentives, the 
empirical case for this type of tax law is relatively weak. One study 
found that the NMTC causes industry sorting across location, 
leading to increase investment in capital intensive industries like 
manufacturing but deters investment in more labor-intensive 
industries.214 Others found that the NMTC does have a positive 
                                                                                                     
housing will benefit newcomers to the community, as preexisting residents 
presumably already had housing. Nothing in the law requires that community 
residents would have priority with respect to new or rehabilitated housing. These 
lack of safeguards suggest that the QCT and DDA are better viewed as 
spatially-oriented investment tax incentives. These provisions have been 
critiqued as contributing to concentrated poverty and residential segregation, 
potentially making conditions worse for the preexisting communities. 
 209. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (explaining how the tax credit applies when 
invests in a qualified community development entity, which makes the qualified 
entity investment on behalf of the taxpayer).  
 210. See I.R.C. §45D(e) (2018) (defining the low-income community where the 
investment must be made for the tax credit). 
 211. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (stating the law permits new buildings and other 
buildings). 
 212. See id. (explaining the definition of low-income communities and stating 
the investment must be in this community to be applicable).   
 213. See id. (stating that there is preference to projects that help concerted 
community plans, but it is not mandatory); see also Martin D. Abravanel et al., 
New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program Evaluation, URB. INST. X, 67x (2016), 
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/new-markets-tax-credit-nmtc-
program-evaluation (noting that “the NMTC program does not necessarily involve 
local or community agencies as program participants” and that “emphasis on 
producing community benefits was uneven across early-year NMTC projects”) (on 
file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 214. See Kaitlyn Harger & Amanda Ross, Do Capital Tax Incentives Attract 
New Businesses? Evidence Across Industries from the New Markets Tax Credit, 56 
J. REG. SCI. 733, 734 (2016) (explaining the study).  
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impact on employment but that newly created jobs tend to go to 
non-residents,215 and that some of the positive neighborhood 
changes are attributable to gentrification.216 To this point, it is 
worth reiterating that indirect investment tax incentives like the 
NMTC are capable of delivering deeper subsidies than those 
associated with direct incentives. This may make them more 
effective at supporting new construction and other 
capital-intensive projects that can contribute to gentrification. 
At least one legal scholar has reviewed the types of projects 
that have been funded by the NMTC and found that it “has been 
used to subsidize the development of performing arts centers for 
opera, ballet, symphony orchestras, hotels, high priced 
condominiums, theatres, mixed use commercial developments, and 
even convention centers.”217 It is difficult to know how investments 
like these impact community residents, but it is reasonable to 
conclude, as the researcher did, that “such uses are not well 
designed as primarily for a community and population” 
experiencing the effects of concentrated poverty, and the “salient 
issue is whether the people's tax dollars are used to meet the needs 
of the low-income residents as earmarked by Congress.”218  
The new Opportunity Zones tax law is another example of a 
spatially-oriented, indirect tax incentive.219 Notwithstanding 
recent comparisons of the new law with enterprise zone programs, 
Opportunity Zone laws are more analogous to the NMTC. Under 
the new Opportunity Zones tax law, taxpayers who sell 
appreciated property can defer—or even permanently avoid—
taxes they would otherwise owe on capital gains by reinvesting the 
capital gains in so-called “Opportunity Funds.”220 Opportunity 
                                                                                                     
 215. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (explaining how the NMTC’s 
impact may not directly help the residents of the area).  
 216. See id. (finding that the NMTC has some positive effects on neighborhood 
conditions in low-income communities but observing that the observed impacts 
are attributable to changes in the composition of residents as opposed to 
improvements in the welfare of existing residents). 
 217. Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 8 
FLA. TAX REV. 214, 216 (2007). 
 218. Id. at 231. 
 219. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018) (explaining how the Opportunity Zone tax 
law is based on low income communities in qualified opportunity zones).  
 220. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1)(A) (2018) (stating that treatment of gains in 
gross income “shall not include so much of such gain as does not exceed the 
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Funds are required to make new equity investments in businesses 
located in designated low-income areas called “Opportunity 
Zones.”221 
The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that the 
Opportunity Zones program will cost between $1.2 and $1.8 billion 
of lost revenue per year,222 amounts that correspond to $6–9 billion 
of capital flowing into Opportunity Funds (assuming a 20% capital 
gains rate) each year.223 This suggests that Opportunity Zones may 
help direct roughly two to three times as much capital into 
low- income areas than the NMTC program, which provides for 
$3.5 billion of tax credit allocations annually.224 
While it is too early to assess the impact of the Opportunity 
Zones law, the Opportunity Zones statute and available agency 
guidance provide no reasons to expect the Opportunity Zones laws 
to benefit poor communities any more effectively than the NMTC. 
Instead, they include several reasons to expect the new laws to 
target poor communities even less closely than the NMTC. For 
example, the Opportunity Zones laws define low-income 
communities by reference to the same definition in the NMTC 
statute.225 As a result, Opportunity Zones are comprised of a subset 
                                                                                                     
aggregate amount invested by the taxpayer in a qualified opportunity fund during 
the 180-day period beginning on the date of such sale or exchange”).  
 221. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2) (2018) (defining qualified opportunity zone 
property as property which is qualified opportunity zone stock, qualified 
opportunity zone partnership interest, or quality opportunity zone business 
property); I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1) (2018). 
 222. See JCX-67-17, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for 
H.R. 1, the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” JOINT COMM. TAX’N (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 (estimating the 
potential lost revenue stemming from the Opportunity Zones program per year 
over the course of ten years) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 223. Id. at 222. 
 224. See I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(G) (2018) (identifying the new markets tax credit 
limitation for 2010–2019). 
 225. Any population census tract if the poverty rate for such tract is at least 
20 percent, or (i) in the case of a tract not located within a metropolitan area, the 
median family income for such tract does not exceed 80 percent of statewide 
median family income, or (ii) in the case of a tract located within a metropolitan 
area, the median family income for such tract does not exceed 80 percent of the 
greater of statewide median family income or the metropolitan area median 
family income. I.R.C. § 45D(e) (2018) (defining low-income community under the 
NMTC); see I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(c)(1) (2018) (stipulating that low-income community 
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of NMTC-eligible census tracts. No further guidance is provided as 
to the types of investments that should be made in Opportunity 
Zones, and the law contains no downstream requirements related 
to job creation or community-oriented activity. 
In addition, where the NMTC program is administered jointly 
with the Treasury Department’s CDFI Fund, which makes tax 
credit allocations to CDEs based on a competitive allocation 
process,226 the new Opportunity Funds program will rely on 
self-certification by Opportunity Funds and very little ongoing 
oversight.227 This is a departure from the structure of other federal 
indirect incentives, which have been administered by the IRS in 
coordination with nontax federal, state and local agencies.228 While 
so-called “hybrid delegations” like these have not always been 
successful in practice, they do help respond to an important 
critique of tax expenditure laws generally, which is that the IRS is 
ill-equipped to administer nontax substantive policies.229 
In sum, the introduction of Opportunity Zones will provide 
new opportunities for researchers to gather data about the impact 
of spatially-oriented indirect investment tax incentives. As noted, 
this type of incentive may be more likely to spur gentrification and 
affect neighborhood demographics than spatially-oriented direct 
                                                                                                     
has the same meaning in both I.R.C. §1400(Z)-1(c)(1) and §I.R.C. §45D(e)). 
. 
 226. See CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW MARKETS TAX 
CREDIT PROGRAM (2018), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/2018%20 
Introduction %20to% 20the%20NMTC%20Program%20-%20FINAL.PDF 
(providing an overview of the administration of the NMTC program, the ability 
for CDEs to apply for the program, and the nature of the competitive allocation 
process) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 227. See Investing in Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. 54279 (proposed Oct. 
29, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing the taxpayer be able to self-
certify as a Qualified Opportunity Fund and the Commissioner’s ability to 
determine the time, form, and manner of self-certification); see also Prop. Reg. 
§ 1.1400Z2(d)-1(a) (outlining how taxpayers could elect to be considered a 
Qualified Opportunity Fund and the impact the election could have on the 
taxpayers gains and interests under the proposed regulation). 
 228. As mentioned, the NMTC is administered in cooperation with the CDFI 
Fund. The LIHTC is administered jointly with state and local housing authorities. 
 229. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and 
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1015 n.198 (2003) (using the food stamp 
program and the provision of school lunches as an example of how the IRS is 
ill- equipped to administer non-tax substantive policies). 
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investment tax incentives. Though empirical studies have failed to 
yield clear evidence that the NMTC has resulted in gentrification, 
those results may be a function of program size. Given that 
Opportunity Zones is a much larger program, it provides new 
opportunities to study the impact of spatially-oriented indirect 
investment tax incentives. In the meantime, it is reasonable to 
predict that Opportunity Zones will have similar—or 
exacerbated—effects as the NMTC, suggesting that the law’s 
potential as an anti-poverty program is limited. 
3. Community-Oriented Investment Tax Incentives 
Examples of community-oriented investment tax incentives 
are rare under current law. This fact alone raises both theoretical 
and empirical questions to be answered by researchers. First, why 
are community-oriented investment tax incentives so uncommon 
under current law? What political and social conditions contribute 
to the continued use of spatially-oriented investment tax 
incentives—and the bipartisan support of those incentives—
despite what many would view as disappointing empirical results? 
To the extent that community-oriented investment tax incentives 
exist under current law, what were the political and social 
conditions that made them viable, and what are the barriers to 
their use by other jurisdictions? 
Second, what impact do community-oriented investment tax 
incentives have on neighborhoods and community residents? To 
answer this question, researchers need to be able to identify 
examples of community-oriented investment tax incentives in 
order to deliberately study their impact. As this Section will 
explain, few pure examples of community-oriented investment tax 
incentives exist under current law, making it challenging for 
researchers to gather the data needed to assess their impact. This 
section will describe examples of community-oriented investment 
tax incentives that exist under current law and pertinent studies. 
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1. Direct Tax Incentives 
A handful of state enterprise zone programs include at least 
one community-oriented direct tax incentive.230 These tax 
incentives generally exist alongside other, spatially-oriented direct 
tax incentives.231 Under current law, few, if any, rules restrict 
eligible investments to those most likely to benefit poor 
communities.232 However, some state enterprise zone laws do 
include workforce development incentives with safeguards for poor 
residents.233 In addition, two state laws make taxpayer eligibility 
contingent on engagement with community residents, as opposed 
to the location of the firm.234 Enterprise zone tax incentives like 
these are community-oriented direct investment tax incentives. 
For example, enterprise zone laws in Connecticut, Florida and 
Texas offer taxpayers larger incentives for hiring community 
residents than most nonresidents;235 however, they also offer 
                                                                                                     
 230. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, ENTERPRISE 
ZONES: DEVELOPMENT FOR DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES (2005), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/econ/EntZonesDev.pdf (outlining the purposes, 
incentives, and community effects of enterprise zone programs) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 231. Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise Zone Tax 
Incentives (Working Paper, May 1, 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3381243. For example, several states combine 
incentives that encourage taxpayers to hire zone residents with incentives to invest 
in a broad range of eligible investments that are not designed to target community 
residents. See infra Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C.  
 232. See infra Appendix A (demonstrating that even when the eligible types 
of investments are narrowly defined, those laws tend to promote manufacturing 
and production activities, which are not as likely to benefit low-skilled residents 
as service-oriented jobs); see also Ross & Wolf, supra note 52, at 18. 
 233. See infra Appendix B (showing that only two out of 33 states with current 
enterprise zone law include incentives that require business to hire zone 
residents). See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, ENTERPRISE 
ZONES: DEVELOPMENT FOR DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES (2005), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/econ/EntZonesDev.pdf (showing how different 
states, like Louisiana and Illinois, only get the incentives if a certain percentage 
of workers are from a specified disadvantaged group) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 234. See LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1787(B)(3) (tying eligibility to hiring zone 
residents, not the firm location); Tex. Gov't C. § 2303.402 (tying eligibility to 
hiring zone residents, not the firm location). 
 235. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217(e) (West 2019) (providing that the 
group’s net income be calculated in compliance with §12-218(a), which states the 
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equivalent tax benefits to firms that hire vulnerable populations of 
nonresidents, such as people who are eligible for benefits under 
state welfare programs, veterans, or other economically 
disadvantaged persons.236 Because these laws contain specific 
incentives to benefit community residents, they can be properly 
categorized as community-oriented direct incentives, but their 
impact may be diluted by the alternate incentives. As a result, 
studies of their impact may convey limited information about the 
impact of community-oriented direct investment tax incentives. 
Nevertheless, at least one study of community-oriented direct 
investment tax incentives in Texas provided some evidence to 
suggest that the laws helped reduce poverty rates in the targeted 
area.237 The Texas enterprise zone law, “creates explicit incentives 
to hire from, although not necessarily create jobs in, areas 
designated as EZs.”238 Texas law creates tax incentives for hiring 
                                                                                                     
“combined group's net income shall be the aggregate net income or loss of each 
taxable member and nontaxable member of the combined group derived from a 
unitary business . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.096 (West 2019) (outlining the 
hiring and compensation requirements needed in order for an eligible business to 
qualify for the credit); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (outlining how a business 
qualifies as a qualified business and requiring that 25% of the worker live within 
the zone). In addition, at least two states tie the availability of hiring tax credits 
to employees’ residence within the county or municipality that contains the zones. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63N-2-212 (West 2019) (limiting tax incentives to business 
entities for which at least 51% of the employees employed at facilities of the 
business entity located in the enterprise zone are individuals who, at the time of 
employment, reside in the county in which the enterprise zone is located; or an 
enterprise zone that is immediately adjacent and contiguous to the county in 
which the enterprise zone is located); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27H-78 (requiring that 
employee be residents of the municipality in which the zone is located, or a 
resident of a municipality in which another enterprise zone has been designated). 
 236. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217(e) (outlining how a combined group 
can qualify); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.096 (describing the kinds of new employees 
that qualify under this section); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (including 
inmates, those unemployed for three months, and individuals with disabilities, 
among others, in the definition of economically disadvantaged for the purpose of 
this section). 
 237. See generally Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business Incentives and 
Local Labor Markets, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311 (2013) (outlining the program 
structure of the Texas Enterprise Zone project and showing empirical evidence 
that the program leads to growth in work-place employment and resident 
employment). 
 238. Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business Incentives and Local Labor 
Markets, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311, 312 (2013) (focusing on one state allows the 
author to isolate outcomes and achieve better results).  
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community residents, veterans, or economically disadvantaged 
persons.239 Those tax incentives are available to firms regardless of 
whether the firm itself is located in the enterprise zone.240 A study 
of the impact of these laws found that they helped increase 
resident employment in high-poverty zones (near 20% poverty 
rate) by 1–2 percent per year.241 This is an encouraging result for 
those who hope place-based investment tax incentives may be 
effective anti-poverty tools. However, more research would be 
needed to confirm results like these, and one should be cautious of 
making policy decisions based on a single study.  
Moreover, more research would be needed to assess what 
specific design feature might drive such results—the specific 
incentive to hire area residents, or the widespread availability of 
the incentives to firms located outside zone boundaries. Here, it is 
worth noting that a California law that provided tax incentives for 
firms to hire employees from “targeted employment areas” (as long 
as the hiring firm was located within the zone) was repealed in 
2013.242 The legislature cited findings that the program had been 
unsuccessful.243 This may suggest that it is not enough to tie 
incentives to hiring community residents. In short, more research 
is needed to fully evaluate the impact of community-oriented direct 
tax incentives. 
2. Indirect Tax Incentives 
Few, if any, pure community-oriented indirect investment tax 
incentives exist under current law. One reason for this gap may be 
that, of the factors that tend to suggest a community-oriented 
approach, the feature that can be most easily incorporated into this 
model would be a narrow definition of eligible investments. This 
approach is rarely seen under current law. 
                                                                                                     
 239. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (providing incentives for qualified 
businesses to hire different groups of community residents). 
 240. Id. (allowing the qualified business to either reside in the state or provide 
commitment to initiating conduct and business activity within the zone). 
 241. Freedman, supra note 238, at 312. 
 242. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.74(b)(4) (2019) (repealed 2019). 
 243. See Cal. A.B. No. 93 § 1(c) (July 11, 2013) (calling for comprehensive 
reform to lead to statistically significant increases in employment levels and 
growth). 
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Nevertheless, so-called neighborhood assistance tax credits fit 
imperfectly into this model.244 For example, Pennsylvania law 
provides tax credits to individuals who contribute to entities that 
provide “neighborhood assistance, comprehensive service projects, 
affordable housing, domestic violence or veterans' housing 
assistance, job training or education for individuals, community 
services or crime prevention in an impoverished area.”245 This law 
subsidizes contributions to nonprofit entities, which invest in 
low- income communities;246 however, one can imagine similarly 
restrictive language incorporated into the design of incentives to 
subsidize for-profit investment.  
To date, little is known about the impact of 
community-oriented indirect tax incentives. Since so few examples 
exist under current law, the best chances for researchers to gather 
data to evaluate their potential as anti-poverty tools may be to 
work with policymakers to introduce pilot programs. More 
research is needed to determine the ideal tax incentive design and 
to assess implementation challenges. Until such research is 
available, our understanding of the potential and limitations of 
place-based investment tax incentives as anti-poverty tools will 
remain incomplete.  
IV. Conclusion 
This Article has developed a typology that identifies four basic 
types of place-based investment tax incentives, two of which are 
relatively common under current law, and two that are exceedingly 
rare. While it is possible that any given place-based investment tax 
incentive may include a combination of features that straddle the 
categories, making it more difficult to apply the typology,247 there 
                                                                                                     
 244. Layser, supra note 22, at 66–68 (including “financial assistance, labor, 
material and technical advice to aid in the physical, economic and community 
improvement” in neighborhood assistance programs through “community 
services, crime prevention, economic development, education, housing, and job 
training.”). 
 245. See 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8904-A(a) (West 2019) (allowing tax credits for 
businesses taking part in the aforementioned activities).  
 246. Id. (explaining one of the effects of the law). 
 247. See Smith, supra note 30, at 380 (asserting that the problem of sorting 
real-life cases into theoretical categories is a challenge under any typology).  
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are both practical and theoretical reasons to adopt this typology 
despite such challenges. 
First, as this Article showed, most current laws adopt a 
monolithic spatially-oriented approach, making it relatively 
simple to categorize them despite the theoretical difficulty. Second, 
even if multi-faceted approaches to targeting place become more 
common, legal analysis is well suited to deal with this 
complication. Balancing tests are prevalent in legal analysis and 
can be applied here as well. To the extent that spatially-oriented 
features dominate, the incentive can be categorized with other 
spatially-oriented incentives, even if some community-oriented 
features are present. Thus, this typology holds promise as a tool to 
enable more deliberate research into how tax law design affects the 
impact of place-based investment tax incentives. 
Finally, the typology presented in this Article describes a 
conceptual, theoretical ideal. To that end, it is immaterial whether 
every place-based investment tax incentive can be easily sorted 
into one category or another. Rather, one of the most important 
functions of this typology is to provide benchmarks that force 
lawmakers to confront the assumptions about place that are built 
into these tax laws and affect their performance. In so doing, we 
may finally be able to move beyond the debates about place-based 
investment tax incentives and take steps to reform and expand 
knowledge in this area of tax law and poverty. 
Appendix A: Eligible Investments 











X   
Ala. Code § 41-23-
24; Ala. Code 
§ 41-23-26 
California 
 X  
Cal. Rev. & Tax 
Code 
§ 17053.73(b)(11) 
Colorado  X X Col. Rev. Stat. § 39-30-104(1)(a) 
Connecticut  X X Conn. Gen. Stat. §32-9l 
Delaware  X X Del. Code tit. 30 § 2020; Del. Code 
458 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 403 (2019) 
tit. 30 § 2010 
District of 
Columbia X   
Unspecified 
Florida X   Unspecified 
Georgia 
X   
Ga. Code Ann., 
§ 36-88-3(2 and 
8), and Ga. Code 
Ann., § 36-88-4(a-
c). 
Hawaii  X X Haw. Rev. Stat. § 209E-2. 
Illinois X   35 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20 § 5/201(f) 
Indiana 
 X  
Ind. Code § 6-3-3-
10 
Louisiana 
X  X 
La. Rev. Stat. 
§ 51:1787(B)(3) 
Maryland X   Md. Code Econ. 
Dev. § 9-103 
Michigan  X  Mich. Comp. L. 
§ 207.777 
Minnesota X   Minn. Stat. 
§ 469.1732 
Missouri 
X   
Mo. Rev. Stat. tit. 
X § 135.230; Mo. 
Rev. Stat. tit. X 
§ 135.100 
Montana X  X Mont. Code Ann. § 7-21-3710 
Nevada X   Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 22 § 274.270 
New 
Hampshire  X X 
N.H. Rev. Stat. 
12 § 162-N:6 
New Jersey 
X   
N.J. Stat. 
§ 52:27H-74; N.J. 
Stat. § 52:27H-62 
New 
Mexico  X  
 N.M. Stat. § 7-2-
18.4; N.M. Stat. 
§ 7-2-15 
New York X   N.Y. Tax L. § 210-B (repealed) 
North 
Carolina  X  
N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 105-129.83 
North 
Dakota  X  
N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 40-63-04 
Ohio  X X Ohio. Rev. Code §§§ 5709.631 
Oklahoma 
 X X 
Okla. Stat. 5A 
§ 690.4;  
Okla. Stat. 68 
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Appendix B: Incentives to Invest in Human Capital or 
Affordable Housing 
§ 2357.4 
Oregon  X X Or. Rev. Stat 26A § 285C.135 
Pennsylvan
ia X   
72 Pa. Stat. 
§ 8904-A 
Rhode 
Island X   
Unspecified 
Tennessee X   Unspecified 
Texas 
X   
Tex. Gov't C. 




 X X 
Utah Code § 63N-
2-213; Utah Code 
§ 63N-2-302; 























Alabama X   Ala. Code § 41-23-24(a)(1) 
California 
X   















Delaware X   Del. Code tit. 30 § 2020; Del. 
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Code tit. 30 
§ 2011 
District of 
Columbia X   
D.C. Code § 2-
219.01-219.05. 
Florida 
 X  
Fla. Stat. tit. 




X   
Ga. Code Ann., 
§ 36-88-3(2, 6-








Illinois    None 
Indiana   X Ind. Code § 6-3-3-10 
Louisiana  X  La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1787(A)(2) 
Maryland 




Michigan  X  Mich. Comp. L. § 207.777 
Minnesota X   Minn. Stat. § 469.171 
Missouri 
 X  
Mo. Rev. Stat. 
tit. X 
§ 135.110; Mo. 
Rev. Stat. tit. X 
§ 135.230 
Montana 





 X  




Hampshire X   
N.H. Rev. Stat. 
12 § 162-N:6 
New Jersey X   N.J. Stat. § 52:27H-76 
New Mexico    None 
New York 
X   




Carolina  X  
N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 105-129.83 
North X   N.D. Cent. 
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Appendix C: Taxpayer Eligibility 
Dakota Code § 40-63-
04 
Ohio 








X   
Okla. Stat. 5A 




X   




X   
72 Pa. Stat. 
§ 8904-A 
Rhode Island 
 X  
R.I. Gen. L. 
1956 § 42-64.3-
6 
Tennessee   X Tenn. Code § 13-28-208 
Texas  X  Tex. Gov't C. § 2303.402 
Utah 




































X   
Ala. Code § 41-23-
24; Ala. Code § 41-
23-26 
California 
X X  
Cal. Rev. & Tax. 
Code 
§ 17053.73(b)(11)(A
); Cal. Rev. & Tax. 
Code § 23626 
Colorado X   C.R.S. § 39-30-104 







(hiring tax credits). 
Connecticut X  X Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-217(e) 
Delaware 
X   
Del. Code tit. 30 
§ 2020; Del. Code 
tit. 30 § 2010 
District of 
Columbia X X  
D.C. Code § 6-
1504; DC ST 
§ 2-219.01 
Florida 
X   
Fla. Stat. tit. XIX 
§ 212.096 
Georgia 
X X  
Ga. Code Ann., 
§ 36-88-3(2 and 8), 
and Ga. Code Ann., 
§ 36-88-4(a-c). 
Hawaii X   Haw. Rev. Stat. § 209E-9 
Illinois X   35 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20 § 5/201(f) 
Indiana X  X Ind. Code § 6-3-3-10 
Louisiana   X La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1787(B)(3) 
Maryland X   Md. Code Econ. Dev. § 5-707 
Michigan 
X  X 
Mich. Comp. L. 
§ 207.777; Mich. 
Comp. L. § 207.773 
Minnesota X   Minn. Stat. § 469.171 
Missouri 
X  X 
Mo. Rev. Stat. tit. 
X § 135.230; Mo. 
Rev. Stat. tit. X 
§ 135.240 
Montana X   Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 7-21-3710 
Nevada X   Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 
22 § 274.260 
New 
Hampshire 




X   
N.J. Stat. 
§ 52:27H-74; N.J. 
Stat. § 52:27H-62; 
N.J. Stat. 







X   
N.M. Stat. § 7-2-
18.4; N.M. Stat. 
§ 7-2-15 
New York 
X   
N.Y. Code Rules & 
Reg. § 11.1 
North 
Carolina 




X   N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 40-63-04 
 
Ohio X   
Ohio. Rev. Code 
§§§ 5709.61; Ohio. 
Rev. Code 
§§§ 5709.64 
Oklahoma X   Okla. Stat. 5A § 690.4 
 
Oregon X   
Or. Rev. Stat 26A 
§ 285C.135; Or. 
Rev. Stat 26A 
§ 285C.200 
Pennsylvania 




X   R.I. Gen. L. 1956 
§ 42-64.3-3 
Tennessee X  X Tenn. Code § 13-28-208 
Texas   X Tex. Gov't C. § 2303.402 
Utah 
X   
Utah Code § 63N-
2-213; Utah Code 
§  63N-2-215; Utah 
Admin. C. R357-
15-5 
Wisconsin X   Wis. Stat. § 238.399 
